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Hegel’s doctrine in the XXI century remains relevant for the Russian politico-legal science due to the deep development of the categorical apparatus and methodological tools for expressing the value nature of law and state. Hegel's doctrine of the subject of law, especially presented in his early works, is one of the little-studied, but at the same time very significant part of his scientific work, the appeal to which should contribute to the further development of the modern system of legal categories. Purpose: to carry out a comparative analysis of the various versions of the Hegelian doctrine of the personality as a subject of law and its genesis, taking into account the peculiarities of natural law and theological pproaches. Methods: the authors use logical, historical-genetic, historical-comparative, systemic method of cognition, as well as the methodology of theoretical and legal comparative studies. Results: in the late philosophical system, Hegel develops the doctrine of the dual nature of the personality as a subject of law: as a specific subject, a person mediates his relationship with other subjects through a single objective thing (qualitative characteristics of the subject), as an abstract subject, a person bases his relations with them on recognition as equal subjects of freedom (quantitative characteristics of the subject). The way to resolve this conflict is through morality. During various periods of his scientific work, Hegel considers the genesis of the personality as a subject of law from a natural law and theological point of view, including the idea of God, while  dentifying new substantive aspects of the concept of the subject of law, related to the the historical development of the state and the formation of the rule-of-law state.

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В статье дается анализ «признания» как существенного элемента правовых отношений, что у Г.В.Ф. Гегеля означает отношение к «Другому» как к свободному и как к равному мне в этой свободе индивидууму. Понимание права в контексте проблематики «признания» составляет важную отличительную черту гегелевской теории права. В своем развернутом и систематизированном виде учение о «признании» в праве было изложено в параграфе «Бытие в признанности» (Annerkantsein) в неопубликованной рукописи «Йенская реальная философия», которая именно поэтому сохраняет свою актуальность для истории и теории государства и права. The article analyzes the "recognition" as an essential element of legal relations, that GVF. Hegel means the attitude to the "Other" as to the free and as an individual equal to me in this freedom. Understanding law in the context of the “recognition” problem is an important distinguishing feature of Hegel's theory of law. In its expanded and systematized form, the doctrine of "recognition" in law was set forth in the paragraph "Being in recognition" (Annerkantsein) in the unpublished manuscript "Jena's real philosophy", which for this reason remains relevant for the history and theory of state and law.

Аннотация. И. Кант формирует новую парадигму философии права, основанную на идее свободы. Место системообразующего элемента философии права, которое в рамках парадигмы естественного права занимал концепт естественного закона, у И.Канта занимает высший нравственный закон. Однако эта идея не получает у него содержательной экспликации, а значит и идея свободы остается абстракцией. Г.Гегель стремится преодолеть абстрактность И.Канта в учении о свободе за счет принципа историзма, который он постепенно развивает в своих ранних произведениях. I. Kant creates a new paradigm of the philosophy of law, which is based on the idea of freedom. The place of the main element of the philosophy of law, which in the framework of the paradigm of natural law was occupied by the concept of natural law, in I.Kant is occupied by the highest moral law. However, this idea does not receive the meaningful development of explication from him, which means that the idea of freedom remains an abstraction. G.Hegel seeks to overcome Kant's abstractness in the doctrine of freedom at the expense of the principle of historicism, which he gradually develops in his early works.