1 One-Party Dominance in African Democracies: A Framework for Analysis

Doorenspleet, Renske; Nijzink, Lia

doi:10.1515/9781626372658-002

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Without a viable alternative to the incumbent party, potential swing voters may not exist in sufficient numbers to generate incentives for party responsiveness during the candidate nomination phase. Thus, we expect our findings to generalize better to democracies where strong parties face a relatively consolidated opposition (Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2013).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…For parties with centralized candidate selection systems, existing accounts identify two general reasons why party leaders may be motivated to override constituent preferences when it comes to selecting candidates. First, party decision-makers may favor stalwarts and loyalists in order to advance a cohesive ideological agenda (Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2013). Parties, according to Hazan (2002, 119), fear that "if party lists are assembled not by the party organs, but instead by more inclusive selectorates ... the party's ability to aggregate policies and present a cohesive ideological image is weakened."…”

Section: Centralized Candidate Selection and Electoral Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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When Do Strong Parties “Throw the Bums Out”? Competition and Accountability in South African Candidate Nominations

2021

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Section: Centralized Candidate Selection and Electoral Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

When Do Strong Parties “Throw the Bums Out”? Competition and Accountability in South African Candidate Nominations

2021

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“…The multi‐party system does not only enhance preference and freedom of association, but it also equally encourages diversity of association and weakens primordial sentiments due to multi‐directional group interactions (Busia, 1967). This is unlike the nonparty and one‐party structure that encourages homogeneity with its consequential interpersonal and intergroup animosity (Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013).…”

Section: Rotational Democracy: the Conceptual Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Africa and the prospects of rotational democracy

Ibanga

2024

The Philosophical Forum

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Sharing of social, economic, and political opportunities is crucial for the stability of many African states. Democracy has been identified as an inclusive framework that allows individuals to freely contest for these opportunities. However, in Africa, democracy appears not to work as compared to Western democratic societies. Some African political philosophers blame the problem on liberal democratic type practiced in the continent, which is modeled after the hegemonic socio‐political discourse in Europe and North America. Thus, it is argued that workable democratic model for Africa must be embedded in the continent's cultural and historical nuances. Consequently, initial effort by the Ghanaian philosopher Kwasi Wiredu appealed to the nonpartisan Consensus Democracy of traditional Akan society. But it is doubtful that the consensual model, which was successful in the mono‐ethnic traditional Akan society, will produce the same effect in a multi‐ethnic society as the modern African states. At present, ethnicity inter alia remains a major obstruction to democratization of the continent. Africa needs a democratic model that takes its rigid multi‐ethnic character into account instead of uncritically imposing global democratic knowledge to African situations or totally disregarding local knowledge of democracy. Therefore, I investigate how ethnicity inter alia can be accommodated in democratic practice. An experimental model called “Rotational Democracy” is introduced based on the traditional African social practice of One Cup, which embodies the phenomena of power rotation and rationing of the traditional society. The article demonstrates how indigenous knowledge can be the starting point for democratic practice in Africa.

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“…3 This imbalance is attributed to, among other factors, the centralization of patronage within the Presidency, the lack of constitutional checks and balances and the tendency towards AQ1 ¶ one-party dominance. 4 Echoing several of these themes, scholars of Uganda suggest that, after 30 years in power, President Museveni has achieved AQ2 ¶ an 'extreme centralization of power'. 5 His dominance results from the abuse of state resources, attacks on formal legislative and judicial institutions, manipulation of security forces, and the consolidation of an ostensibly 'no-party', 'Movement' system into a de facto single-party regime and finally, after 2005, a hegemonic ruling AQ3 ¶ party.…”

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confidence: 99%

From the electoral battleground to the parliamentary arena: understanding intra-elite bargaining in Uganda’s National Resistance Movement

Collord

2016

Journal of Eastern African Studies

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Following the Uganda's 2005 multiparty transition, observers expected the country's legislaturean unusually assertive body by regional standardsto lose its bite, muzzled due to newly reinstated party disciplinary measures. This article explains whycontrary to these expectationsexecutive-legislative tensions persist and, more fundamentally, what this tells us about the nature of one-party and executive dominance in Uganda. Inspired by a comparative politics literature on parties as well as an older generation of Africanist scholarship, the analysis centres on the nexus linking political finance, party-building and legislative independence. The article argues that the legacy of Uganda's 'noparty' Movement system endures, perpetuated through the highly personalized and contentious nature of electoral mobilization. By failing to recentralize control of campaign finance, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) leadership has left parliamentary candidates largely to their own devices while undermining its own nascent efforts to ensure greater party institutionalization. The consequence of this failure to institutionalize the ruling party plays out in a more assertive legislature, where NRM MPswho form the overwhelming majorityfrequently rebel against the party line. Unable to enforce partisan discipline, Museveni is compelled to buy back legislators' support through executive patronage. While he generally succeeds in subduing Parliament, especially towards the end of a legislative term, this success is by no means automatic. As such, the Ugandan legislature is best understood as an arena for intra-elite bargaining, its independence contingent on the push-and-pull between President Museveni and unruly NRM MPs.

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1 One-Party Dominance in African Democracies: A Framework for Analysis

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

When Do Strong Parties “Throw the Bums Out”? Competition and Accountability in South African Candidate Nominations

When Do Strong Parties “Throw the Bums Out”? Competition and Accountability in South African Candidate Nominations

Africa and the prospects of rotational democracy

From the electoral battleground to the parliamentary arena: understanding intra-elite bargaining in Uganda’s National Resistance Movement

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