Abstract:This paper is intended as a critical response to the emerging consensus within both academic and policy literatures that we are currently facing an epidemic of corruption which threatens to undermine the stability of economic and political development on both a national and global scale, and which requires both immediate and wide-ranging policy interventions. Based on a review of the publications and policy statements of the leading anti-corruption crusadersnamely the OECD, the IMF, and the World Bankit will b… Show more
“…One important element is arguably that problematizations of the activities were firmly embedded within what Hjellum [2006, p. 9; see also Everett et al (2006) and Williams and Beare (1999)] calls a ''political offence against corruption'' in Norway. 3 This offence has led to a number of corruption scandals during the past few years; indeed, the first half of 2008 has involved an equal amount of scandals in Norway as the preceding 14 years (Gedde-Dahl et al, 2008).…”
“…One important element is arguably that problematizations of the activities were firmly embedded within what Hjellum [2006, p. 9; see also Everett et al (2006) and Williams and Beare (1999)] calls a ''political offence against corruption'' in Norway. 3 This offence has led to a number of corruption scandals during the past few years; indeed, the first half of 2008 has involved an equal amount of scandals in Norway as the preceding 14 years (Gedde-Dahl et al, 2008).…”
“…Furthermore, the principle of calculated self-interest of market exchange collides with principles of open sharing and reciprocal exchange found in societies that are not deeply influenced by industrial capitalism. It is this collision of capitalist self-interest and traditional reciprocal exchange which is often related to the observed 'corruption eruption' attributed to the internationalization of economic markets (Williams/Beare 1999). The question at hand is whether globalisation of business has increased the prevalence of corruption or has globalisation increased the visibility and sensibility of corruption.…”
Section: The Institutional Levelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Corporations wish to be able to operate as inexpensively and rationally as possible throughout the world. Systems of graft and bribes are unpredictable, unreliable and costly (Williams/Beare 1999). Nevertheless, those who are struck by these regulations might say that they only promote international business at the expense of the local economy.…”
Section: Neutralization Techniquesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Brown and Cloke (2006: 281): 'Recently, together with several other commentators (Hanlon 2004;Harrison 2003;Michael 2004;Polzer 2001;Szeftel 1998;Williams/ Beare 1999) we have been promoting the need for critical academic reflection upon the growing calls for an international 'anti-corruption' crusade'. Why, then, has there been such an explosion of interest in corruption since the 1990s, and why is there such an apparent political commitment towards tackling the problem (Brown/Cloke 2004) when there is no evidence that corrupt behavior has increased?…”
Section: Power and The Consequences Of Anti-corruption Discoursesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An alternative reading of the influence of globalization on corruption is that it has increased the sensitivity for corruption. Based on the review of the publications and policy statements of the leading anti-corruption crusaders -namely the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank - Williams and Beare (1999) claim that the key change that has occurred over the past few years is not the growth of overall levels of corruption or the severity of its effects on domestic economic growth, but rather, the reframing of corruption as a source of economic risk and uncertainty that must necessarily be problematized according to the objectives and interests of the global economy.…”
The use of kickbacks and illicit payments to win foreign sales is eroding fair trade and undermining good governance around the world. While often seen as discrete acts by unscrupulous businesses, bribery in international trade is better seen as driven by push and pull forces larger than individual firms. Two hypotheses on the dynamics of transnational bribery are formulated and tested in this study. The demand-pull hypothesis views multinational corporations as victims of corruption in host countries and predicts a positive relationship between corruption in host countries and bribery by guest businesses. The supply-push hypothesis treats multinationals as proactive parties and proposes a positive relationship between pro-bribery conditions in exporting countries and the inclination of their multinationals to foreign bribery. Analysis of cross-national data yielded no support for the demand-pull hypothesis, but strong backing for the supply-push hypothesis. This finding validates the potential of effective bribery reduction through supply-side controls.
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