A Care Ethical Theory of Right Action

Steyl, Steven

doi:10.1093/pq/pqaa063

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Depending on how we view the relationship between care's components, we can gauge whether care itself can act as a bridge between 'is' and 'ought', or whether we require moral principles external to care to bridge this crucial gap. This discussion could be particularly important in the context of Steven Steyl's recent and valuable efforts to develop a care ethical theory of right action (Steyl 2021). Steyl suggests that care theorists must work towards building such a theory through available conceptual resources.…”

Section: Care Ethics As a Moral Theory: From Is To Oughtmentioning

confidence: 99%

Care as a Thick Ethical Concept

Chadha-Sridhar

2023

Res Publica

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Philosophers who study care—most often, care ethicists—are involved in an ongoing discussion about the concept of care. Despite the significant progress made in this discussion, certain conflicting images of care seem to persist in the literature. On one hand, as feminist theorists across disciplines have highlighted, care is a complex social practice that is mired in inequality and injustice. The deeply gendered nature of caring and the unequal division of care-work creates and cements structural inequalities. On the other hand, care is also thought of as a moral value or an ideal. The ethics of care—a moral theory with decidedly feminist roots—is predicated on the idea that caring is somehow morally valuable. A discrepancy thus arises: care is a social practice that compounds injustices. But it is also a moral value. What is it about care that makes it malleable to such variations? To pick out this complexity and capture the conceptual nuances at play, this paper suggests that we frame the concept of care as a thick ethical concept. I will first demonstrate why this framing is helpful. Then, I will provide accounts of the descriptive and evaluative elements of the concept of care. I hope to show that it is through a thick conceptual framing that we can make sense of care—both as a complex social practice and an important moral value in the worlds that we inhabit.

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Section: Care Ethics As a Moral Theory: From Is To Oughtmentioning

confidence: 99%

Care as a Thick Ethical Concept

Chadha-Sridhar

2023

Res Publica

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“…At the same time, however, care theory may be able to maintain its contextualism while also providing greater insight into its own account of ethical action. Indeed, Steyl demonstrates that a cohesive theory of right action is demanded by early works in the field, critiques of mainstream moral theory notwithstanding (Steyl, 2021, p. 6). While Steyl's own proposal is tied to his argument for a virtue ethical basis for care theory, several of his clarifications are helpful for care theorists of any stripe.…”

Section: The Metaethical Critiquementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Referencing the old debate of the relative positions of an ethics of care and an ethics of justice, 41 Steyl makes the valid point that a supplementalist approach – which sees care ethics as supplementing, rather than fully replacing, an ethics of justice – assumes that the ethics of justice itself is insufficient and cannot be revised into sufficiency. Steyl is correct that care theorists have not proven this and that, pending such a proof, care ethics must pursue a monistic theory of right action (Steyl, 2021, p. 10). A reconfigured version of the care/justice debate would be particularly interesting in the context of an expanded care theory, where some may now be more interested in revising a theory of justice so as to be consistent with the demands of care 42 .…”

Section: The Metaethical Critiquementioning

confidence: 99%

From care ethics to pluralist care theory: The state of the field

Gary

2022

Philosophy Compass

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In a moment where needs for care are acute and their provision precarious, feminist care ethics has gained new relevance as a framework for understanding and responding to necessary interdependence. This article reviews and evaluates two long‐standing critiques of care ethics in light of this recent research. First, I assess what I call the pluralist feminist critique, or the dispute over the ability of care ethics to address the needs and histories of a range of marginalized subjects. I identify two forms of this critique: the first disputes the biased starting points shaping the development of the theory, and the second concerns the weaponization of care in support of domination. Although these critiques are well‐established, I draw attention to recent responses that move care theory in generative directions. I argue that the pluralist feminist critique demands both self‐critical transformation in dialog with other feminist schools of thought and a robust account of care ethics' normative authority. I then take up critiques those levied by mainstream ethicists concerned with care theory's adequacy as an ethical approach. I show that recent work on normative authority, conceptual uniqueness, and the grounding of responsibility must be engaged before care theory can be dismissed as “under‐theorized.” In articulating these two sets of critiques and evaluating recent rebuttals to them, I argue for a pluralist feminist theory of care within which strands informed by varying philosophical schools and methods can coexist.

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“…Beyond resisting its subsumption into the moral theories already indicated, 2 cases are being made for additions, adjustments, and refinements within care ethics. Taking as examples some recent work in this area, as well as articles in this journal: Stephanie Collins readily embraces principles (Collins 2015), Steven Steyl adumbrates a theory of right action (Steyl 2020a), and Thomas Randall offers a novel justification for partiality (Randall 2020). Early care ethicists drew back from principles, detailed accounts of right action, and typically toocertain forms of partiality in ethics as given.…”

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confidence: 99%

Degrees of Care: Success, Recognition, and Completion

Bennett

2023

Hypatia

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Care ethics has attracted much scholarly attention since its inception in the 1980s. As befits a moral theory, which is how it is frequently perceived, those working in the field have increasingly sought to clarify and make robust elements central to the project. This article hopes to offer a small but important contribution to this iterative process. I make a case for resisting what is characterized as the recognition claim found in the work of Joan Tronto, Nel Noddings, and Eva Feder Kittay. This is the claim that for an action to be caring it is necessarily recognized as such by whomever is being cared for. I explicate the arguments pertaining to this issue in these authors’ writings and conclude that not only do the arguments fall short of showing the necessity for including this aspect in an ethics of care, but I make preliminary arguments as to the implications for resisting the inclusion of the recognition claim. The thrust of these suggestions is that care ethics is a better moral theory when it admits to degrees of care rather than taking a binary view.

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A Care Ethical Theory of Right Action

Cited by 5 publications

References 32 publications

Care as a Thick Ethical Concept

Care as a Thick Ethical Concept

From care ethics to pluralist care theory: The state of the field

Degrees of Care: Success, Recognition, and Completion

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