2011
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.06.024
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A choice experiment on fuel taxation and earmarking in Norway

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Cited by 104 publications
(88 citation statements)
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“…This descriptive evidence is in line with much of the literature, which nds that in general individuals tend to neglect the incentive eect of environmental taxation (Dresner et al 2006;Steg et al 2006; see also Kallbekken and Aasen 2010;Saelen and Kallbekken 2011). It also shows that people expect a larger eect on themselves than on the average population, but we cannot completely rule out strategic voting.…”
Section: Variables and Descriptive Statisticssupporting
confidence: 74%
“…This descriptive evidence is in line with much of the literature, which nds that in general individuals tend to neglect the incentive eect of environmental taxation (Dresner et al 2006;Steg et al 2006; see also Kallbekken and Aasen 2010;Saelen and Kallbekken 2011). It also shows that people expect a larger eect on themselves than on the average population, but we cannot completely rule out strategic voting.…”
Section: Variables and Descriptive Statisticssupporting
confidence: 74%
“…While the authors call for the use of larger samples to support their findings, they suggest that acceptable carbon tax designs are not a chimaera. Saelen and Kallbekken (2011) show, with a choice experiment, that the chances for carbon taxes to be acceptable are higher with earmarking for environmental revenues. With this type of recycling, the Norwegian population would agree to increase the current fuel tax rate by about 15%.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Studies show that, for example, contributions to taxes increase when these taxes are earmarked for specific purposes (e.g. Hundsdoerfer et al 2013, Sclen andKallbekken, 2011) and that child benefits are related to higher spending on child related products (e.g. Kooreman, 2000, Del Boca andFlinn, 1994).…”
Section: Experimental Designmentioning
confidence: 99%