A climate agreement with full participation

Reciprocal climate negotiators

“…(Financial Times editorial, 12.11.14). 4 The literature based on repeated games does include some more optimistic results as well, however; see Froyn and Hovi (2008) Combining a simple participation model from Barrett (2003) with a reciprocity model based largely on Rabin (1993), I show that three stable coalition sizes may be feasible: zero participation; a minority coalition; and a majority or even full participation coalition. For the latter to be stable, however, reciprocity preferences must be strong and widespread -possibly more so than the experimental literature indicates.…”

A Full Participation Agreement on Global Emission Reduction through Strategic Investments in R&D

“…Froyn and Hovi [6] offer a more optimistic view. They show that it may be possible to sustain full participation in one single agreement without watering down abatement levels.…”

“…Following Froyn and Hovi [6], a global agreement with full participation, that is, k = N, can be accomplished by a strategy called Penance-m. Penance-m is characterized by three actions. First, each participating country plays cooperate as long as all other participating countries play cooperate as well.…”

“…This can be achieved by limiting the number of countries that are permitted to punish a noncompliant country which has deviated from the agreement. Froyn and Hovi's [6] findings can also be transferred to a model where countries can choose the level of abatement in every period, as Asheim and Holtsmark [7] demonstrate. They show that a "broad and deep" agreement with full participation and abatement at an efficient level can always be achieved if the countries' common discount factor is sufficiently high.…”

An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases

“…Barrett (1999Barrett ( , 2002, Asheim et al (2006), Froyn and Hovi (2008), Asheim and Holtsmark (2009) as well as Kratzsch et al (2010) consider an infinitely repeated N -player prisoner's dilemma game, with a stage game giving each country the choice between participating in an agreement that induces an emission reduction and rejecting the agreement. All authors assume that payoffs are identical in each stage game, i.e., there is no lasting effect of a one-period emission over time.…”