A combinatorial theory of modality

Hüpakka, Janne; Keinänen, Markku; Korhonen, Anssi

doi:10.1080/00048409912349241

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…For what it is worth, I do not think that that necessity can in fact be reduced.16 Thomas 1996 andHippaka et al 1999 defend the viability of non-reductive versions of combinatorialism.…”

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confidence: 93%

Is There A Quasi-Mereological Account of Property Incompatibility?

Kalhat¹

2010

Acta Anal

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Armstrong's combinatorial theory of possibility faces the obvious difficulty that not all universals are compatible. In this paper I develop three objections against Armstrong's attempt to account for property incompatibilities. First, Armstrong's account cannot handle incompatibilities holding among properties that are either simple, or that are complex but stand to one another in the relation of overlap rather than in the part/ whole relation. Secondly, at the heart of Armstrong's account lies a notion of structural universals which, building on an objection by David Lewis, is shown to be incoherent. I consider and reject two alternative ways of construing the composition of structural universals in an attempt to meet Lewis' objection. An important consequence of this is that all putative structural properties are in fact simple. Finally, I argue that the quasi-mereological account presupposes modality in a way that undermines the reductionist aim of the combinatorialist theory of which it is a central part. I conclude that Armstrong' quasi-mereological account of property incompatibility fails. Without that account, however, Armstrong's combinatorial theory either fails to get off the ground, or else must give up its goal of reducing the notion of possibility to something non-modal.

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“…For what it is worth, I do not think that that necessity can in fact be reduced.16 Thomas 1996 andHippaka et al 1999 defend the viability of non-reductive versions of combinatorialism.…”

mentioning

confidence: 93%

Is There A Quasi-Mereological Account of Property Incompatibility?

Kalhat¹

2010

Acta Anal

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“…because we don't have a God's eye perspective and from our perspective on Earth we can't see that the Earth is moving) this initial shock is no longer compelling. 26 For non-hylomorphic accounts of grounding modality see Bealer (2002), Camerone (2012), Elder (2004), Ellis (2009), Forbes (1985, Gibbard (1975), Goswick (2010), Hale (2002), Humberstone (1991), Hupakka, Keinanen, and Korhonen (1999), Kripke (1972), Paul (2004), Quine (1966), andSider (2003). 27 The hylomorphist rejects Bennett's (2004) gloss of the difference between (i) the sort being more fundamental and the modal properties being derived from it and (ii) the modal properties being more fundamental and the sort being derived from them.…”

Section: Hylomorphism Response-dependence and Grounding Modalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

Goswick

2018

Metaphysics

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The view that ordinary objects are composites of form and matter ("hylomorphism") can be contrasted with the more common view that ordinary objects are composed of only material parts ("matter only"). On a matter-only view the hard question is modal: which modal profile does that (statue-shaped) object have? Does it have the modal profile of a statue, a lump, a mere aggregate? On a hylomorphic view the hard question is ontological: which objects exist? Does a statue (matter-m + statue-form), a lump (matter-m + lump-form), and/or a mere aggregate (matter-m + mere aggregate-form) exist? I defend a novel answer to the hard question for hylomorphism. In particular, I argue that which ordinary objects exist depends, in part, on how subjects respond to the matter they encounter. I argue that, with regard to grounding the existence and modal properties of ordinary objects, response-dependent hylomorphism is superior to both matter only views and to non-response-dependent versions of hylomorphism.

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A combinatorial theory of modality

Cited by 2 publications

References 8 publications

Is There A Quasi-Mereological Account of Property Incompatibility?

Is There A Quasi-Mereological Account of Property Incompatibility?

The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

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