2009
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1080.0624
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A Comparison of Electricity Market Designs in Networks

Abstract: In the real world two classes of market designs are implemented to trade electricity in transmission constrained networks. Analytical results show that in two node networks integrated market designs reduce the ability of electricity generators to exercise market power relative to separated market designs. In multi node networks countervailing effects make an analytic analysis difficult.We present a formulation of both market designs as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. We find that in a real… Show more

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Cited by 74 publications
(52 citation statements)
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References 30 publications
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“…This yields highly nonlinear VI operators in Proposition 3. We first note that the stopping test for the smoothing method was triggered after six VI solves on average: j ≤ 6 in (16). The second observation is a noticeable difference in the total solution time: with our approach the average time spent in each scenario was about half a second, while the AVaR reformulation needed more than eight seconds per scenario.…”
Section: Performance Of the Smoothing Approachmentioning
confidence: 94%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This yields highly nonlinear VI operators in Proposition 3. We first note that the stopping test for the smoothing method was triggered after six VI solves on average: j ≤ 6 in (16). The second observation is a noticeable difference in the total solution time: with our approach the average time spent in each scenario was about half a second, while the AVaR reformulation needed more than eight seconds per scenario.…”
Section: Performance Of the Smoothing Approachmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…Among related literature, however mostly casting the problem in deterministic or risk-neutral settings, we refer to [11,25,1,35,36,38,26,16,10,48]. We also mention [9], which emphasizes the tradeoff between maximal profit and minimal risk for thermal power producers in a pool-based electricity market.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Continuing with comparisons between implicit and explicit auctions for electricity trade and transmission, Ehrenmann and Neuhoff [27] extend the equilibrium problem formulation introduced by Cardell et al [28] -a Stackelberg game -to represent an integrated market design, and the mixed complementarity problem formulation in Hobbs et al [29] -a Cournot game -to represent a separate market design, in the presence of market power. They show that in a simple two-node network, the integrated market design reduces the exercise of market power; however, for more complicated networks they are unable to determine a general ranking.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We will focus here on game-theoretic formulations, although other approaches such as bi-level programming and mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints are also possible. References on the topic are numerous; with no claim of being exhaustive we mention [3,4,19,23,24,28,29,31,[60][61][62]77,91,109,110].…”
Section: Example 5 (Rolling Horizon Decomposition For Risk Averse Mulmentioning
confidence: 99%