A Comparison of Perinatal Mortality in Korea on Holidays and Working Days

Hong, Jae-Seok; Kang, Han Byul; Yi, Sang-Wook; Han, Young Ja; Nam, Chung Mo; Bayasgalan, Gombojav; Ohrr, Heechoul

doi:10.1097/01.ogx.0000256752.11317.85

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“…Likewise, parental aversion for an April 1 birthday is likely to lead to an increase in the number of births on March 31 and April 2. MacFarlane, 1978MacFarlane, , 1979Hendry, 1981;Mangold, 1981;Mathers, 1983;Dowding et al, 1987;Gould et al, 2003;Luo et al, 2004;Hong et al, 2007). The majority of these papers find that while the infant mortality rate is higher on weekends, this does not necessarily mean that it is more dangerous for a given child to be born on a weekend.…”

Section: (Ii) Inauspicious Daysmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is also plausible that doctors avoid weekend births for altruistic reasons: because they believe that weekend births are causally more dangerous. This would not affect doctors' incentives, but it would change the interpretation of our results.8 See for example MacFarlane (1978); Mangold (1981); Hendry (1981); Mathers (1983); Dowding et al (1987); Gould et al (2003); Luo et al (2004);Hamilton and Restrepo (2006);Hong et al (2007).9 We have been unable to identify any datasets that would allow us to look at the prevalence of birth complications on inauspicious dates.…”

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confidence: 90%

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Bargaining Over Labour: Do Patients Have Any Power?*

Gans

Leigh

2011

Economic Record

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We provide a new method of identifying the level of relative bargaining power in bilateral negotiations using exogenous variation in the degree of conflict between parties. Using daily births data, we study negotiations over birth timing. In doing so, we exploit the fact that fewer children are born on the ‘inauspicious’ dates of February 29 and April 1; most likely, we argue, reflecting parental preferences. When these inauspicious dates abut a weekend, this creates a potential conflict between avoiding the inauspicious date (the parents’ likely preference), and avoiding the weekend (the doctor’s likely preference). Using daily births data, we estimate how often this conflict is resolved in favour of the physician. We show how this provides an estimate of how bargaining power is distributed between patients and physicians.

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Section: (Ii) Inauspicious Daysmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bargaining Over Labour: Do Patients Have Any Power?*

Gans

Leigh

2011

Economic Record

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Bargaining Over Labor: Do Patients Have Any Power?

Gans

Leigh

2011

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. licence. www.econstor.eu If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S IntroductionBargaining theory -most notably Nash bargaining -has seen a resurgent application in policy work. In labor, family, and health economics, applied analyses use the Nash bargaining solution as the basis for evaluating policy outcomes. Invariably, however, researchers are forced to make assumptions regarding the distribution of bargaining power between agents so as to derive quantitative predictions of the consequences of various policy interventions. The purpose of this paper is to propose a method by which information on the distribution of bargaining power can be extracted from data based solely on the outcomes of bilateral negotiations. The identification method uses a source of exogenous variation in the degree of conflict between two parties in a negotiation. Combining this with bargaining outcomes, we can identify the share of the surplus each party will receive on average. The idea is that -in some situations -both, one or the other, or neither party will be indifferent as to a particular outcome. That variation will allow us to determine whether other sources of variation as distinct from variation in preferences are driving observed agreements. Importantly, in utilizing this, we rely on Nash bargaining theory in its axiomatic form rather than any well-defined protocol of offer and acceptance. 3The context we apply this method to is doctor-patient negotiations with regard to birth timing decisions. This is an application of independent policy interest in health economics. It is generally thought that physicians have power to determine patient Consequently, we generate an estimate of bargaining power free of issues associated with the structure of negotiating environments, as this is something we do not observe.3 The axiomatic nature of Nash bargaining means that the underlying theory motivating our empirical identification strategy is independent of strong behavioural assumptions common...

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A Comparison of Perinatal Mortality in Korea on Holidays and Working Days

Cited by 2 publications

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Bargaining Over Labour: Do Patients Have Any Power?*

Bargaining Over Labour: Do Patients Have Any Power?*

Bargaining Over Labor: Do Patients Have Any Power?

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