A Comprehensive Definition of Illocutionary Silencing

Caponetto, Laura

doi:10.1007/s11245-020-09705-2

Cited by 35 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Usually, silencing refers to the failure of that intentional meaning to receive uptake from an audience. For example, a phenomenon like illocutionary silencing-which is what philosophers usually seem to have in mind when talking about silencing-necessarily involves a speaker actively and intentionally expressing meaning (Caponetto, 2020; see also : Tanesini, 2018). Indeed, part of what is so pernicious about instances of illocutionary silencing is that someone is speaking even though they might as well not be.…”

Section: Imposed Silencementioning

confidence: 99%

Experiences of Silence in Mood Disorders

Degerman

2023

Erkenn

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This article challenges the consensus that silences about mental disorders are there to be broken. While silence in mental disorders can be painful, even deadly, the consensus rests on an oversimplified understanding of silence. Drawing upon accounts from depression and bipolar memoirs, this article names and analyses some salient experiences of silence in mood disorders. It does so with two goals in mind. The first is to show that mood disorders may involve several different kinds of lived experiences of silence. This is important because even though silence is considered a promising objective symptom of depression, little has been written about lived experiences of silence in disorders that involve depression. The second is to argue against the fetishisation of breaking silence and the concomitant understandings of silence as an externally imposed and inherently negative phenomenon. This is important because some silences are not experienced as external and are even felt to be valuable, meaning that efforts to break them may be counterproductive.

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Section: Imposed Silencementioning

confidence: 99%

Experiences of Silence in Mood Disorders

Degerman

2023

Erkenn

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“…1 The notion of silencing has been developed extensively within a broadly Austinian framework by Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton (see Langton 1993, Hornsby 1995, Hornsby & Langton 1998. See also more recent work by Ishani Maitra (2009), Kristie Dotson (2011), Mary Kate McGowan (2019), and Laura Caponetto (2020. The notion of discursive injustice, which is my primary focus here, has been developed by Kukla (2014), as well as Tannesini (2016Tannesini ( , 2020.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Discursive Injustice and the Speech of Indigenous Communities

Townsend¹

2021

The Social Institution of Discursive Norms

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“…The audience might also fail to recognize that the speaker has the required authority, that she is sincere and that she is expressing her true feelings. See McGowan (2019) andCaponetto (2021). 10 It could be objected that Example 3 describes a defective context, that is, a context in which the interlocutors disagree about the state of the score.…”

Section: Conversational Exercitives and Standingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Not All Speakers are Equal: Harm and Conversational Standing

Jaque¹

2021

Daimon

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McGowan ha proporcionado un meca-nismo lingüístico que explica cómo el lenguaje puede constituir daño. Su idea es que las profe-rencias de manera rutinaria establecen normas-s sobre qué está permitido en un contexto dado. Mi objetivo es argumentar que estas normas-s son sensibles a la posición conversacional del hablante. En concreto, sostengo que la fuerza de la norma establecida depende de la posición del hablante. En algunos casos, el hablante puede incluso carecer de la posición requerida para esta-blecer nuevas normas-s. McGowan has provided a linguistic mechanism that explains how speech can constitute harm. Her idea is that utterances routinely enact s-norms about what is permissible in a given context. My aim is to argue that these s-norms are sensitive to the conversational standing of the speaker. In particular, I claim that the strength of the norm enacted depends on the standing of the speaker. In some cases, the speaker might even lack the standing required to enact new s-norms.

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A Comprehensive Definition of Illocutionary Silencing

Cited by 35 publications

References 33 publications

Experiences of Silence in Mood Disorders

Experiences of Silence in Mood Disorders

Discursive Injustice and the Speech of Indigenous Communities

Not All Speakers are Equal: Harm and Conversational Standing

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