A Consent Theory of Contract

Barnett, Randy E.

doi:10.2307/1122705

Cited by 181 publications

(40 citation statements)

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“…Empirical evidence and theory suggests that, absent genuine consent (Barnett, 1986(Barnett, , 2002, contractual arrangements are not sustainable because they do not facilitate the creation of the maximum potential value (Kronman & Posner, 1979;Sebenius, 1992). This is apparent in the frequent instabilities of those business partnerships and contractual arrangements which fail to manage tensions such as "cooperation versus competition, rigidity versus flexibility or short-term versus long-term orientation" (Das & Teng, 2000, p.94).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this sense, legally-enforceable contracts are manifestations of consent (McKendrick, 2002) that "circumscribe the valuation of conduct" (Collins, 1999, p 21) and give legal effect to exchange relationships. Consent is an inter-cognitive achievement (Barnett, 1986(Barnett, , 1992b(Barnett, , 2002 between contracting parties which bring certain property rights (Foss & Foss, 2005) in the sense of entitlements to a system of exchange relationships (Biggart & Delbridge, 2004). Contracting parties could manifest their consent to performance targets at physical level, monetary level as well as informational or knowledgebased level (Essig & Arnold, 2001;Mouzas & Ford, 2012).…”

Section: Performance-based Contractingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Performance based contracting in long-term supply relationships

Mouzas

2016

Industrial Marketing Management

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The study investigates performance-based contracting in long term-supply relationships. Evidence in the context of supply relationships involving manufacturers of consumer and pharmaceutical products, service providers and grocery retailers indicates that the performance that companies buy and sell can be analyzed as specific combinations of effectiveness, efficiency and risk. While firms engage in a complex and time-consuming process to design and agree upon performance targets, incentive mechanisms and involved risks of buying and selling future performance, they often fail in achieving excellence in all performance targets.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Performance-based Contractingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance based contracting in long-term supply relationships

Mouzas

2016

Industrial Marketing Management

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“…17 Already Lysander Spooner criticized the contract theory based on promises. See also Barnett (1986Barnett ( , 1992 for problems associated with a contract theory relying on promises. On the title transfer theory of contract see Evers (1977) and Rothbard (1982).…”

Section: Why Maturity Mismatching Is Ethical and The Underlying Contrmentioning

confidence: 99%

Entrepreneurial Error Does Not Equal Market Failure

2016

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Barnett and Block (forthcoming) claim that Bagus and Howden (2012b) support indirectly the concept of market failure. In this paper we show that maturity mismatching in an unhampered market may imply entrepreneurial error but cannot be considered a market failure. We demonstrate why fractional-reserve banking leads to business cycles even if there is no central bank and why maturity mismatching does not per se lead to clusters of errors in a free market. Finally, we assure that, in contrast to the examples provided by Barnett and Block, maturity mismatching does not imply the creation of two incompatible contracts due to the fungible nature of money.

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“…The participants in a contract each bring to it those rights the contract will manipulate [23]. The logic of the contract together with the decisions of the participants determines which derived rights they each walk away with.…”

Section: Toward Distributed Electronic Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed Electronic Rights in JavaScript

Miller

Cutsem

Tulloh

2013

Programming Languages and Systems

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Abstract. Contracts enable mutually suspicious parties to cooperate safely through the exchange of rights. Smart contracts are programs whose behavior enforces the terms of the contract. This paper shows how such contracts can be specified elegantly and executed safely, given an appropriate distributed, secure, persistent, and ubiquitous computational fabric. JavaScript provides the ubiquity but must be significantly extended to deal with the other aspects. The first part of this paper is a progress report on our efforts to turn JavaScript into this fabric. To demonstrate the suitability of this design, we describe an escrow exchange contract implemented in 42 lines of JavaScript code.

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A Consent Theory of Contract

Cited by 181 publications

References 0 publications

Performance based contracting in long-term supply relationships

Performance based contracting in long-term supply relationships

Entrepreneurial Error Does Not Equal Market Failure

Distributed Electronic Rights in JavaScript

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