Corporate venture capital (CVC) investors are regularly painted with the same brush, a fact underscored by the often observed belief in the extant literature that corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) form a homogeneous group. In contrast to this simplifying perspective, this paper categorizes CVCs into subgroups by examining their levels of strategic and financial investment motivation using computer-aided text analysis and cluster analysis. To validate the resulting clusters, this paper studies the impact of CVC type on startup valuation from an intra-group perspective by applying hierarchical linear modeling, thus illustrating which particular investment motivation might be preferable to others in the context of negotiating valuations. An empirical analysis of 52 CVC mission statements and 147 startup valuations between January 2009 and January 2016 revealed that first, CVCs with a strategic investment motivation assign lower startup valuations than CVCs with an analytic motivation that have moderate levels of the two scrutinized dimensions, suggesting that entrepreneurs trade off these CVCs' value-adding contributions against a valuation discount; second, CVCs with an unfocused investment motivation pay significantly higher purchase prices, thus supporting the hypothesis that they have a so-called liability of vacillation; and third, the valuations of CVCs with a financial investment motive are not significantly different from JEL Classification C12 Á C30 Á C38 Á G24 Á G32 Á M13