A contest success function for networks

Bozbay, Irem; Vesperoni, Alberto

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.022

Cited by 17 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…13 The intuition is that active players try to succeed in the contest (which gives all active players a chance) while inactive 12. This is the standard premise of the axiomatic foundation of a class of success functions, see for example, Bozbay and Vesperoni (2018).…”

Section: A4 Perfect Discrimination At Zeromentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is the standard premise of the axiomatic foundation of a class of success functions, see for example, Bozbay and Vesperoni ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See Corchón and Dahm () and Jia, Skaperdas, and Vaidya () for reviews on the axiomatic and stochastic foundations of success functions for single‐winner contests. For more recent contributions to the axiomatic foundation of success functions for single‐winner and multiprize contests we refer to Lu and Wang (, ), Cubel and Sanchez‐Pages (), Vesperoni (), Bozbay and Vesperoni (), and references therein.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Contests With Draws: Axiomatization and Equilibrium

Vesperoni

Yildizparlak

2019

Economic Inquiry

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We introduce and axiomatize a class of single‐winner contest success functions that embody the possibility of a draw. We then analyze the game of contest that our success functions induce, having different prizes delivered in the occurrence of a win and a draw. We identify conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric interior Nash equilibrium and show that equilibrium efforts and equilibrium rent dissipation can be larger than in a Tullock contest (with no possibility of a draw) due to increased competition even if the draw‐prize is null. These results suggest that a contest designer may profit from introducing the possibility of a draw. Finally, we show that this approach naturally extends to multiprize contests with multiple draws across different subsets of the set of players. (JEL C72, D72, D74)

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Section: A4 Perfect Discrimination At Zeromentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is the standard premise of the axiomatic foundation of a class of success functions, see for example, Bozbay and Vesperoni ().…”

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Contests With Draws: Axiomatization and Equilibrium

Vesperoni

Yildizparlak

2019

Economic Inquiry

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“…Early developments are by Krueger (1974), Posner (1975) Tullock (1980), etc., reviewed by Nitzan (1994). Skaperdas (1996) considers symmetric contests, Clark and Riis (1998) analyze asymmetric contests, Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2016) assess difference-form contest success functions, Bozbay and Vesperoni (2018) evaluate contest success functions for networks and Münster (2009) examines group contests. Rai and Sarin (2009) allow multiple types of investments.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Additive multi-effort contests

Hausken

2020

Theory Decis

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This article analyzes rent seeking with multiple additive efforts for each of two players. Impact on rent seeking occurs even when a player exerts only one effort. This contrasts with models of multiplicative efforts with impact on rent seeking only when a player exerts all its available efforts. An analytical solution is developed when the contest intensities are below one, and equal to one for one effort. Then, additional efforts causing interior solutions give players higher expected utilities and lower rent dissipation, which contrasts with earlier findings for multiplicative efforts. Players cut back on the effort with contest intensity equal to one, and exert alternative efforts instead. Accounting for solutions which have to be determined numerically, a Nash equilibrium selection method is provided. For illustration, an example with maximum two efforts for each player is provided. Equilibria are shown where both players choose both efforts, or one player withdraws from its most costly effort. Both players may collectively prefer to exclude one of their efforts, though in equilibrium, they may prefer both efforts. When all contest intensities are equal to one or larger than one, only the one most cost-effective effort is exerted, due to the logic of linear or convex production. Rent dissipation increases in the contest intensity, and is maximum when the players are equally advantaged determined by unit effort cost divided by impact.

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“…See also Shamma and Arslan (2004) who unify existing Lyapunov arguments in a set-up with a "soft-max" best response. 4 Recent papers that look at con ‡ict networks include Bozbay and Vesperoni (2018), Dziubiński et al (2016a), Franke and Öztürk (2015), Huremović (2014), Jackson and Nei (2015), König et al (2017), Kovenock et al (2015), Kovenock and Roberson (2018), Matros and Rietzke (2018), and Xu et al (2019), among others. For a survey, see Dziubiński et al (2016b).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fictitious play in networks

Ewerhart

Valkanova

2020

Games and Economic Behavior

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This paper studies …ctitious play in networks of noncooperative twoperson games. We show that continuous-time …ctitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria if the overall n-person game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1= , regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary nperson zero-sum games with bilinear payo¤ functions do not possess the continuoustime …ctitious-play property. As extensions, we consider networks in which each bilateral game is either strategically zero-sum, a weighted potential game, or a twoby-two game. In those cases, convergence requires a condition on bilateral payo¤s or, alternatively, that the network is acyclic. Our results hold also for the discrete-time variant of …ctitious play, which implies, in particular, a generalization of Robinson's theorem to arbitrary zero-sum networks. Applications include security games, con ‡ict networks, and decentralized wireless channel selection.

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A contest success function for networks

Cited by 17 publications

References 49 publications

Contests With Draws: Axiomatization and Equilibrium

Contests With Draws: Axiomatization and Equilibrium

Additive multi-effort contests

Fictitious play in networks

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