A Contextual Account of Character Traits

Upton, Candace L.

doi:10.1007/s11098-004-6218-6

“…The proper way to distinguish and relate the different levels of generality is in terms of the driving interests‐in‐explanation that philosophers have in a particular case; and of course, the nature of the case itself partly determines this although our own special purposes matter as well. Thus the present account both draws from and supports virtue‐based contextualism (see Sarah Wright 2010, Greco 2009, Thomas 2008, and Upton 2005).…”

Section: The Logic Of Intellectual Trait Ascription and The Generasupporting

confidence: 66%

“… 1 For other recent and related treatments of character‐trait ascriptions see Fricker 2007 and 2008 and Upton 2005. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad

Axtell¹

2010

Metaphilosophy

2

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In this article, the logic and functions of character-trait ascriptions in ethics and epistemology is compared, and two major problems, the ''generality problem'' for virtue epistemologies and the ''global trait problem'' for virtue ethics, are shown to be far more similar in structure than is commonly acknowledged. Beyond the aporia of character-trait ascription and between the Scylla and Charybdis that virtue theories are faced with in each field of philosophy, we find our passage by making full and explicit use of the ''narrow-broad spectrum of trait ascription,'' and by accounting for the various uses of it in an inquiry-pragmatist account. In virtue theories informed by inquiry pragmatism, the agential habits and abilities deemed salient in explanations/evaluations of agents in particular cases, and the determination of the relevant domains and conditions that an agent's habit or ability is reliably efficacious in, is determined by pragmatic concerns related to our evaluative epistemic practices.The sea is still the aporetic place par excellence, and it is still the best metaphor for the aporia of discourse.-Sarah Kofman, ''Beyond Aporia? '' (1988, 78) r

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“…The proper way to distinguish and relate the different levels of generality is in terms of the driving interests-in-explanation that philosophers have in a particular case; and of course, the nature of the case itself partly determines this although our own special purposes matter as well. Thus the present account both draws from and supports virtue-based contextualism (see Sarah Wright 2010, Greco 2009, Thomas 2008, and Upton 2005.…”

Section: The Logic Of Intellectual Trait Ascription and The Generalit...supporting

confidence: 62%

Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad

Axtell¹

2010

Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic

1

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In this article, the logic and functions of character-trait ascriptions in ethics and epistemology is compared, and two major problems, the ''generality problem'' for virtue epistemologies and the ''global trait problem'' for virtue ethics, are shown to be far more similar in structure than is commonly acknowledged. Beyond the aporia of character-trait ascription and between the Scylla and Charybdis that virtue theories are faced with in each field of philosophy, we find our passage by making full and explicit use of the ''narrow-broad spectrum of trait ascription,'' and by accounting for the various uses of it in an inquiry-pragmatist account. In virtue theories informed by inquiry pragmatism, the agential habits and abilities deemed salient in explanations/evaluations of agents in particular cases, and the determination of the relevant domains and conditions that an agent's habit or ability is reliably efficacious in, is determined by pragmatic concerns related to our evaluative epistemic practices.

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“…In other words, Doris admits that there are traits and dispositions that allow some prediction of behavior but fall far short of traditional virtues (Upton [2005 and 2009] develops a ‘contextual’ account of virtues and character traits that is similar to the local-traits view).…”

Section: The Situationist Critiquementioning

confidence: 99%

Extended Virtues and the Boundaries of Persons

Howell

¹

2016

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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What sorts of things undergird a person's character and what does the answer tell us about the person's relationship to her body, her environment, and the people who surround her? For the purpose of ascribing virtue, vice, and character, what are the boundaries of the person? Traditionally, philosophers have accepted mentalism, the view that only mental features are relevant to character. Even philosophers inclined to say that character is partially constituted by nonmental features would be inclined to accept skindividualism: a person's virtue must involve a disposition that is wholly grounded by features inside the person's skin. Drawing from arguments in the philosophy of mind and data from social psychology, I argue that skindividualism is wrong. Virtues can be extended, in the sense that the grounds for a person's virtues might not be inside that individual's skin. If this is the case, persons are not skindividuals. keywords: ethics, moral psychology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology

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A Contextual Account of Character Traits

Cited by 40 publications

References 1 publication

Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad

Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad

Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad

Extended Virtues and the Boundaries of Persons

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