A covert authentication and security solution for GMOs

Mueller, Siguna; Jafari, Farhad; Roth, Don A.

doi:10.1186/s12859-016-1256-6

Cited by 9 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Designated confirmer signatures and ZK proofs were first suggested in Mueller (2014); Mueller et al (2016) as a basis to mitigate the problem of DNA signature transferability described above. These authors also provided an explicit description of algorithms and a specific watermarking protocol to hide a representation of the digital signature component within the GMO itself.…”

Section: A Cryptography-based Methods To Enhance Dna Signaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As the underlying cryptographic framework has been summarized and enhanced by Xia (2013), this now allows for a more direct description of such DNA signatures, that allows additional improvements relative to Mueller et al (2016). Thereby, enhanced DNA signatures can be based on two legs (via a cryptographic/digital protocol, and via DNA bases/physically), with the following main features.…”

Section: A Cryptography-based Methods To Enhance Dna Signaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution

Mueller¹

2019

Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol.

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This study investigates the role and functionality of special nucleotide sequences (“DNA signatures”) to detect the presence of an organism and to distinguish it from all others. After highlighting vulnerabilities of the prevalent DNA signature paradigm for the identification of agricultural genetically modified (GM) organisms it will be argued that these so-called signatures really are no signatures at all - when compared to the notion of traditional (handwritten) signatures and their generalizations in the modern (digital) world. It is suggested that a recent contamination event of an unauthorized GM Bacillus subtilis strain (Paracchini et al., 2017 ) in Europe could have been—or the same way could be - the consequence of exploiting gaps of prevailing DNA signatures. Moreover, a recent study (Mueller, 2019 ) proposes that such DNA signatures may intentionally be exploited to support the counterfeiting or even weaponization of GM organisms (GMOs). These concerns mandate a re-conceptualization of how DNA signatures need to be realized. After identifying central issues of the new vulnerabilities and overlying them with practical challenges that bio-cyber hackers would be facing, recommendations are made how DNA signatures may be enhanced. To overcome the core problem of signature transferability in bioengineered mediums, it is necessary that the identifier needs to remain secret during the entire verification process. On the other hand, however, the goal of DNA signatures is to enable public verifiability, leading to a paradoxical dilemma. It is shown that this can be addressed with ideas that underlie special cryptographic signatures, in particular those of “zero-knowledge” and “invisibility.” This means more than mere signature hiding, but relies on a knowledge-based proof and differentiation of a secret (here, as assigned to specific clones) which can be realized without explicit demonstration of that secret. A re-conceptualization of these principles can be used in form of a combined (digital and physical) method to establish confidentiality and prevent un-impersonation of the manufacturer. As a result, this helps mitigate the circulation of possibly hazardous GMO counterfeits and also addresses the situation whereby attackers try to blame producers for deliberately implanting illicit adulterations hidden within authorized GMOs.

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Section: A Cryptography-based Methods To Enhance Dna Signaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Cryptography-based Methods To Enhance Dna Signaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution

Mueller¹

2019

Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol.

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“…1 gives a summary how this new paradigm evolved. While others, including the author, began to investigate these challenges almost a decade ago [ 13 , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] ], the term cyberbiosecurity was first (informally) used in [ 20 ]. These authors warned of security issues resulting from the cyberphysical interface of the bioeconomy, as it was recognized that all biomanufacturing processes are in fact CPS (see also Fig.…”

Section: The Uniqueness and Challenge Of Cyberbio Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Facing the 2020 pandemic: What does cyberbiosecurity want us to know to safeguard the future?

Mueller¹

2021

Biosafety and Health

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As the entire world is under the grip of the Coronavirus diseases 2019 (COVID-19), and as many are eagerly trying to explain the origins of the virus and cause of the pandemic, it is imperative to place more attention on related potential biosafety risks. Biology and biotechnology have changed dramatically during the last ten years or so. Their reliance on digitization, automation, and their cyber-overlaps have created new vulnerabilities for unintended consequences and potentials for intended exploitation that are largely under-appreciated. Herein, I summarize and elaborate on these new cyberbiosecurity challenges, (1) in terms of comprehending the evolving threat landscape and determining new risk potentials, (2) in developing adequate safeguarding measures, their validation and implementation, and (3) specific critical dangers and consequences, many of them unique to the life-sciences. Drawing upon expertise shared by others as well as my previous work, this article aims to summarize and critically interpret the current situation of our bioeconomy. Herein, the goal is not to attribute causative aspects of past biosafety or biosecurity events, but to highlight the fact that the bioeconomy harbors unique features that have to be more critically assessed for their potential to unintentionally cause harm to human health or environment, or to be re-tasked with an intention to cause harm. I conclude with recommendations that will need to be taken into consideration to help ensure converging and emerging biorisk challenges, in order to minimize vulnerabilities to the life-science enterprise, public health, and national security.

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“…What new types of data centres would be required? Still in their infancy, nucleic acid-based systems for data storage and other purposes (Mueller et al, 2016;Song and Zeng, 2018) necessitate the design and orchestration of diverse cyber-physical systems 19 for many aspects of the encoding, synthesis, storage, management, retrieval, decoding, and other steps. Unappreciated, unrecognised, and unanticipated ways in which this nascent component of the data economy could traverse the physical, digital, and biological spheres raise issues such as scalability, sustainability, (bio)safety (consequences for human, environmental, and ecosystem health), (bio)security (dual use), and (bio)privacy.…”

Section: Pedagogy-teaching Learning Investigating and Other Activimentioning

confidence: 99%

What is the resource footprint of a computer science department? Place, people, and Pedagogy

2020

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Internet and Communication Technology/electrical and electronic equipment (ICT/EEE) form the bedrock of today’s knowledge economy. This increasingly interconnected web of products, processes, services, and infrastructure is often invisible to the user, as are the resource costs behind them. This ecosystem of machine-to-machine and cyber-physical-system technologies has a myriad of (in)direct impacts on the lithosphere, biosphere, atmosphere, and hydrosphere. As key determinants of tomorrow’s digital world, academic institutions are critical sites for exploring ways to mitigate and/or eliminate negative impacts. This Report is a self-deliberation provoked by the question How do we create more resilient and healthier computer science departments: living laboratories for teaching and learning about resource-constrained computing, computation, and communication? Our response for University College London (UCL) Computer Science is to reflect on how, when, and where resources—energy, (raw) materials including water, space, and time—are consumed by the building (place), its occupants (people), and their activities (pedagogy). This perspective and attendant first-of-its-kind assessment outlines a roadmap and proposes high-level principles to aid our efforts, describing challenges and difficulties hindering quantification of the Department’s resource footprint. Qualitatively, we find a need to rematerialise the ICT/EEE ecosystem: to reveal the full costs of the seemingly intangible information society by interrogating the entire life history of paraphernalia from smartphones through servers to underground/undersea cables; another approach is demonstrating the corporeality of commonplace phrases and Nature-inspired terms such as artificial intelligence, social media, Big Data, smart cities/farming, the Internet, the Cloud, and the Web. We sketch routes to realising three interlinked aims: cap annual power consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, become a zero waste institution, and rejuvenate and (re)integrate the natural and built environments.

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A covert authentication and security solution for GMOs

Cited by 9 publications

References 25 publications

On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution

On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution

Facing the 2020 pandemic: What does cyberbiosecurity want us to know to safeguard the future?

What is the resource footprint of a computer science department? Place, people, and Pedagogy

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