A decision model for competitive remanufacturing systems considering technology licensing and product quality strategies

Rau, Hsin; Budiman, Syarif Daniel; Regencia, Reonella C.; Salas, Angela Denise P.

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.118011

Cited by 18 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…A variety of market structures, competitive models, and information structure models have all been used to study technology licensing approaches by scholars (Wang & Yang, 1999;Wang, 2002;Sen, 2005;Sen & Tauman, 2007;Sen & Bhattacharya, 2017;Niu, 2018;Jeon, 2019;Hattori & Tanaka, 2018, 2021. Other factors that influence the optimal licensing contract include product differentiation (Li & Wang, 2010;Ye & Mukhopadhyay, 2013;Rau et al, 2019;Zou & Chen, 2020;Sen et al, 2021;San Martín & Saracho, 2021), the number of participants (Antelo & Sampayo, 2017), and network effects (Zhao et al, 2014;Zhang et al, 2018). However, in the studies mentioned above, licensing of green technologies has received far less consideration than licensing for manufacturing technologies.…”

Section: Technology Licensingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Shang

Chen

2022

Technological and Economic Development of Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study investigates the green technology licensing strategies of firms with corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a duopoly market. The results show that in the absence of CSR, the optimal licensing contract is fixed-fee licensing for a patent holding firm. In the precent of CSR, the optimal licensing contract for a patent holding firm switches from fixed-fee licensing to royalty licensing with increasing level of CSR if the reduction cost of emissions is high. Moreover, we show that the profit goal of firm and the social welfare goal of government are not always mutually exclusive. If the level of CSR is low, a uniform licensing contract would be preferable. If the level of CSR is high, the optimal licensing contract is inconsistent. Finally, we show that CSR is not always beneficial to the social welfare while CSR benefits the environment. Social welfare benefits from increased CSR degree, but vice versa is true when CSR degree decreases. This research may provide valuable insights into licensing and CSR literature.

show abstract

Section: Technology Licensingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Shang

Chen

2022

Technological and Economic Development of Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Moreover, the manufacturer prefers the third-party remanufacturing mode rather than the manufacturer remanufacturing mode if the third-party remanufacturing cost is relatively low. Rau [23] found that royalty licensing is the better technology licensing strategy compared to the fixed-fee licensing strategy in terms of costs. Rabbani et al [24] presented three multi-level leader-follower Stackelberg game models to investigate whether a manufacturer, in addition to manufacturing new products, should also remanufacture or set a fee for the technology licensing of distributors and cooperate with them in remanufacturing.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition or Authorization—Manufacturers’ Choice of Remanufacturing Strategies

2022

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the face of the cannibalization of remanufactured products produced by independent remanufacturers (IRs), original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) can produce remanufactured products themselves to compete with independent remanufacturers (IRs), or they can authorize the IRs to cooperate because of their seller reputation. This paper studies the key factors that influence OEMs’ choice of remanufacturing strategies. By establishing three two-stage models and comparing them, the thresholds for OEMs to choose different remanufacturing strategies were obtained. There is also an interesting finding that when the authorization fee is higher than a certain value, even if the remanufactured product poses a competitive threat to the new product, the OEM will help the IR improve their remanufacturing technology to save costs and achieve a win–win situation. With the increase in authorization fees, OEMs’ profits will increase first and then decrease, so it is not always better for OEMs to charge higher authorization fees. Whether it is an authorization or a competitive scenario, the improvement in remanufacturing technology by OEMs can increase the output of remanufactured products, which is conducive to environmental protection.

show abstract

“…Wu [10] considered two endogenous mechanisms: technology licensing and R&D joint venture from the perspective of IR. Rau et al [11] proposed a market competition game model between IR's supply chain systems considering technology licensing and product quality strategies. Numerical examples show that royalty licensing is the better technology licensing strategy compared to fixedfee licensing strategy in terms of costs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remanufacturing Mode Selection regarding Technology Development

Wang

2021

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider a Cournot game model between an OEM (original equipment manufacturer) and an IR (independent remanufacturer). The OEM manufactures new products and decides the quality level. IR remanufactures and obtains OEM’s technology through technology licensing or joint R&D. To prevent the cannibalization of new products by remanufactured products, the OEM may be reluctant to disclose latest technology to the IR. When the IR chooses the technology licensing mechanism, it will be in a rather disadvantaged position in the competition. In contrast, joint R&D can avoid this dilemma. The two mechanisms are comparatively analyzed under static equilibrium and complex dynamics from three aspects: (1) the output of new and remanufactured products, (2) the profits of the OEM and the IR, and (3) TEI (total environmental impact) under technology licensing mechanism and joint R&D mechanism, respectively. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, we derive that the joint R&D mechanism can achieve a Pareto improvement over the royalty mechanism under certain conditions. The stability, bifurcation, chaos, and largest Lyapunov exponent are analyzed in the dynamic model. Numerical examples show that chaos may cause the OEM and the IR to lose profits or even be in deficit. But from the perspective of TEI, chaos can be beneficial. Interestingly, some conclusions in the static setting are reversed in the chaotic state. We propose a feedback adjustment method to eliminate chaos.

show abstract

A decision model for competitive remanufacturing systems considering technology licensing and product quality strategies

Cited by 18 publications

References 26 publications

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Competition or Authorization—Manufacturers’ Choice of Remanufacturing Strategies

Remanufacturing Mode Selection regarding Technology Development

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About