A Defence of Musical Idealism

Fictionalism about musical works

“…(Thomasson 2006(Thomasson , 2015 Musical works are mental entities (ideas or representations): mental objects or mental experiences. (Collingwood 1938;Sartre 1940;Cox 1986;Cray and Matheson 2017) There are two general things to say about these accounts: these theories either (1) do not capture the target specified by the musical work concept -insofar as they describe anything at all, it is not what we are probing the world for, given our platitudes/implicit definition -or, (2) they point to a metaphysically dubious category. Debate continues about such categories (e.g.…”

“…Musical works are mental entities (ideas or representations): mental objects or mental experiences. (Collingwood 1938; Sartre 1940; Cox 1986; Cray and Matheson 2017)…”

An Ontology of Ideas

“…Nearby, in the ontology of music, Renée Cox (1986) and Benedetto Croce (1909) have advocated a similar view, as has R. G. Collingwood (1938: 142), with the latter suggesting that such works are ideas (or some similar mental entities) when he said that ‘[t]he work of art is not the collection of noises that result when the tune is played, but the tune in the composer's head’. (For criticism of such views, see Dodd [2007: 26–30] and Wollheim [1980: 34–43]; for alternative interpretations of Collingwood, see Ridley [1997] and Davies [2008]. )…”

Creating abstract objects

“…Cameron (2008) and Kania (2013)) who deny that there are musical works. I set aside also those who think musical works are ideas, such as Cox (1986). Note, though, that Cray and Matheson (2017), think musical works are ideas and construe ideas as concrete.…”