A delay-in-payment contract for Pareto improvement of a supply chain with stochastic demand

Gao, Deng; Zhao, Xuebing; Geng, Wei

doi:10.1016/j.omega.2014.05.008

Cited by 48 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Özer and Wei (2006) show that a combination of buyback and advance purchase contract induces credible information sharing and coordinates the supply chain. There are some articles studying contract design to coordinate the supply chain, including, among others, Cachon and Lariviere (2005), Palsule-Desai (2013), and Gao et al (2014). In contrast, we study the incentives for directly sharing information instead of screening or signaling the information indirectly.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information sharing in a supply chain with a make-to-stock manufacturer

Zhang

2015

Omega

129

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information sharing in a supply chain with a make-to-stock manufacturer

Zhang

2015

Omega

129

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“…Third, our model reveals whether trade credit can improve partner profitability in a dual‐channel supply chain, and explores the impact of partner interest rates, retail channel market share, and cross‐price elasticity. This approach contrasts with the scenario of a single‐channel supply chain, in which past studies have generally concluded that the trade credit benefits the partners (e.g., Luo and Zhang, ; Gao et al., ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Gao et al. () discuss a trade credit contract for a Pareto‐driven improvement of the supply chain under stochastic demand and multi‐period terms. Tong et al.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing strategies for dual‐channel supply chains under a trade credit policy

Qin

Ren

Lei

et al. 2019

Int Trans Operational Res

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This paper discusses the impact of a trade credit policy on alleviating conflicts arising on a dual-channel supply chain that includes one manufacturer and one value-added retailer. We use the Stackelberg game to model the problem and characterize optimal pricing strategies for each supply chain partner, examining different circumstances in terms of retail price and trade credit contracts. When a consistent price strategy is applied in the dual channels under conditions of an exogenous credit period, trade credit can help both partners to achieve win-win situations in the following circumstances: (1) when the retail channel's market share is small and the retailer's interest rate is high; or (2) when the retail channel's market share is large and the retailer's interest rate is lower than the manufacturer's. The study also concludes that when an inconsistent price strategy is applied, a trade credit contract can alleviate channel conflicts when the retailer's interest rate is higher than the manufacturer's. Otherwise, the partners may terminate cooperation. However, when the manufacturer has the power to determine and set the credit period, trade credit cannot alleviate channel conflicts under consistent price and inconsistent price scenarios.

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“…In this section, we give several numerical examples under both disadvantageous and advantageous inequality to illustrate the above theoretical results. For the purpose of our numerical demonstration, we consider that the logistics demand in the market follows the normal distribution [18,35], ∼ (1000, 100 2 ).…”

Section: Numerical Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Channel Coordination in Logistics Service Supply Chain considering Fairness

Wang

Fan

Wang

2016

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Logistics service supply chain (LSSC) is a new type of service supply chain. This paper investigates the channel coordination issue in a two-echelon LSSC composed of one logistics service integrator (LSI) and one functional logistics service provider (FLSP) under fairness concerns. The models for a reservation price-only contract under disadvantageous inequality and advantageous inequality are established, respectively, in which the procurement cost, the potential shortage cost, and the operation cost are considered under stochastic market demand. Based on this model, the LSI's optimal reservation quantity can be determined. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of fairness concerns and the related costs on channel performance and channel coordination. The results are presented in four aspects: (1) channel coordination of the LSSC can be achieved under certain conditions when the LSI experiences advantageous inequality; (2) the spiteful behavior of the LSI leads to the reduction of the channel profit, and channel coordination cannot be achieved when the LSI suffers from disadvantageous inequality; (3) the LSI's reservation quantity and the channel profit are affected by the LSI's fairness concerns; (4) motivated by the concerns of fairness, the LSI's reservation quantity is related not only to his procurement cost and shortage cost but also to the FLSP's operation cost.

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A delay-in-payment contract for Pareto improvement of a supply chain with stochastic demand

Cited by 48 publications

References 22 publications

Information sharing in a supply chain with a make-to-stock manufacturer

Information sharing in a supply chain with a make-to-stock manufacturer

Pricing strategies for dual‐channel supply chains under a trade credit policy

Channel Coordination in Logistics Service Supply Chain considering Fairness

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