A digital design flow for secure integrated circuits

Tiri, Kris; Verbauwhede, Ingrid

doi:10.1109/tcad.2005.855939

Cited by 126 publications

(76 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Such approaches follow algorithmic modifications of the cryptography functions realized either in software or in hardware [36]. In the latter case, circuit based modifications can also be made so as to thwart SCAs (e.g., Dual Rail Technology, special CMOS circuits) [43]. The goal of these countermeasures is making the leakage trace of O 1 indistinguishable from the leakage trace of O 0 .…”

Section: Side Channel Analysis Attack Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploiting Hardware Vulnerabilities to Attack Embedded System Devices: a Survey of Potent Microarchitectural Attacks

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Cyber-Physical system devices nowadays constitute a mixture of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) systems that are meant to operate harmonically under a security critical framework. As security IT countermeasures are gradually been installed in many embedded system nodes, thus securing them from many well-know cyber attacks there is a lurking danger that is still overlooked. Apart from the software vulnerabilities that typical malicious programs use, there are some very interesting hardware vulnerabilities that can be exploited in order to mount devastating software or hardware attacks (typically undetected by software countermeasures) capable of fully compromising any embedded system device. Real-time microarchitecture attacks such as the cache side-channel attacks are such case but also the newly discovered Rowhammer fault injection attack that can be mounted even remotely to gain full access to a device DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory). Under the light of the above dangers that are focused on the device hardware structure, in this paper, an overview of this attack field is provided including attacks, threat directives and countermeasures. The goal of this paper is not to exhaustively overview attacks and countermeasures but rather to survey the various, possible, existing attack directions and highlight the security risks that they can pose to security critical embedded systems as well as indicate their strength on compromising the Quality of Service (QoS) such systems are designed to provide.

show abstract

Section: Side Channel Analysis Attack Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploiting Hardware Vulnerabilities to Attack Embedded System Devices: a Survey of Potent Microarchitectural Attacks

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) is another hardware solution that depends on DDL [37]. Different than scalable hardware architectures [38], the authors in [39] proposed hardware current flattening architecture that used a flatten current feedback module (FCFM) and pipeline current flattening module (PCFM)…”

Section: Side Channel Attacks: Differential Power Analysis Attack (Dpmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security and Privacy Challenges in Cyber-Physical Systems

Aldosari¹

2017

JIS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Cyber-Physical Systems, or Smart-Embedded Systems, are co-engineered for the integration of physical, computational and networking resources. These resources are used to develop an efficient base for enhancing the quality of services in all areas of life and achieving a classier lifestyle in terms of a required service's functionality and timing. Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) complement the need to have smart products (e.g., homes, hospitals, airports, cities). In other words, regulate the three kinds of resources available: physical, computational, and networking. This regulation supports communication and interaction between the human word and digital word to find the required intelligence in all scopes of life, including Telecommunication, Power Generation and Distribution, and Manufacturing. Data Security is among the most important issues to be considered in recent technologies. Because Cyber-Physical Systems consist of interacting complex components and middle-ware, they face real challenges in being secure against cyber-attacks while functioning efficiently and without affecting or degrading their performance. This study gives a detailed description of CPSs, their challenges (including cyber-security attacks), characteristics, and related technologies. We also focus on the tradeoff between security and performance in CPS, and we present the most common Side Channel Attacks on the implementations of cryptographic algorithms (symmetric: AES and asymmetric: RSA) with the countermeasures against these attacks.

show abstract

“…There have been several attacks that exploit weaknesses in caches [5,8,19,21,48,49,50,51,51,52] and branch prediction [6,7,9]. Some countermeasures against these threats include self-destructing keys [32,35,62,72] and new circuit styles that consume the same operational power irrespective of input values [27,38,58,64,65] and microarchitectural techniques [11,22,63,66,69].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tamper Evident Microprocessors

Waksman

Sethumadhavan

2010

2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-Most security mechanisms proposed to date unquestioningly place trust in microprocessor hardware. This trust, however, is misplaced and dangerous because microprocessors are vulnerable to insider attacks that can catastrophically compromise security, integrity and privacy of computer systems. In this paper, we describe several methods to strengthen the fundamental assumption about trust in microprocessors. By employing practical, lightweight attack detectors within a microprocessor, we show that it is possible to protect against malicious logic embedded in microprocessor hardware.We propose and evaluate two area-efficient hardware methods -TRUSTNET and DATAWATCH -that detect attacks on microprocessor hardware by knowledgeable, malicious insiders. Our mechanisms leverage the fact that multiple components within a microprocessor (e.g., fetch, decode pipeline stage etc.) must necessarily coordinate and communicate to execute even simple instructions, and that any attack on a microprocessor must cause erroneous communications between microarchitectural subcomponents used to build a processor. A key aspect of our solution is that TRUSTNET and DATAWATCH are themselves highly resilient to corruption. We demonstrate that under realistic assumptions, our solutions can protect pipelines and on-chip cache hierarchies at negligible area cost and with no performance impact. Combining TRUSTNET and DATAWATCH with prior work on fault detection has the potential to provide complete coverage against a large class of microprocessor attacks. 1Index Terms-hardware security, backdoors, microprocessors, security based on causal structure and division of work.

show abstract

A digital design flow for secure integrated circuits

Cited by 126 publications

References 22 publications

Exploiting Hardware Vulnerabilities to Attack Embedded System Devices: a Survey of Potent Microarchitectural Attacks

Exploiting Hardware Vulnerabilities to Attack Embedded System Devices: a Survey of Potent Microarchitectural Attacks

Security and Privacy Challenges in Cyber-Physical Systems

Tamper Evident Microprocessors

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About