This paper seeks to answer the following question: What is a minimal set of entities that form an ontology of the natural world, given our well-established physical theories? The proposal is that the following two axioms are sufficient to obtain such a minimalist ontology: (1) There are distance relations that individuate simple objects, namely matter points. (2) The matter points are permanent, with the distances between them changing. I sketch out how one can obtain our wellestablished physical theories on the basis of just these two axioms. The argument for minimalism in ontology then is that it yields all the explanations that one can reasonably demand in science and philosophy, while avoiding the drawbacks that come with a richer ontology.Keywords: minimalist ontology, parsimony, Humeanism, relationalism about space-time, ontic structural realism, classical mechanics, quantum physics, Bohmian mechanics
Formulating a minimalist ontologyAny form of a naturalistic metaphysics uses science, notably fundamental physics, as the guide to ontology. However, one cannot read off the ontology from the mathematical structure of a physical theory. The first and foremost purpose of such a structure is to obtain a simple and informative representation of the evolution of a given domain of entities. The mathematical structure uses whatever parameters are appropriate to achieve that aim, but these parameters do not thereby automatically become part of the ontology of the theory. To mention just one prominent example, consider the wave function, which is the central mathematical innovation of quantum physics. It is without doubt a parameter that fulfils the mentioned purpose, but there is an ongoing dispute about what, if any, its ontological significance is. Thus, even if one endorses scientific realism and adopts a naturalistic stance in metaphysics, philosophical argument is called for to develop a proposal for an ontology of a given physical theory, or physics tout court. One way to approach ontology is to draw a distinction between what can be called the primitive ontology of a given physical theory and what is its dynamical structure. The primitive ontology are those entities that, according to the theory, exist simply in the world. The dynamical structure of a physical theory then is made up by all those parameters that are introduced through their function for the evolution of those entities that constitute the primitive ontology. Note that this notion of a primitive ontology is much wider than the sense in which this term is used in the debate about the foundations of quantum mechanics (see Dürr et al. 2013Dürr et al. , p. 29 (first published 1992, and Allori et al. 2008): a primitive ontology in this wide sense does not necessarily have to consist in entities that are localized in threedimensional space or four-dimensional space-time (and what about space or space-time A proposal for a minimalist ontology 2 themselves?). Nonetheless, the paradigmatic example of a primitive ontology is this one: according t...