2019
DOI: 10.1007/s11518-019-5411-2
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A Direct Method of Interval Banzhaf Values of Interval Cooperative Games

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Cited by 21 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…The IBV is not only well-defined for every possible interval games, but also is median-indifferent on the class of size monotonic interval games. By using the interval subtraction operator, it can be explicitly obtained through using only the lower and upper bounds of the coalitions' interval payoffs [8]- [10].…”
Section: A Technical Conceptsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The IBV is not only well-defined for every possible interval games, but also is median-indifferent on the class of size monotonic interval games. By using the interval subtraction operator, it can be explicitly obtained through using only the lower and upper bounds of the coalitions' interval payoffs [8]- [10].…”
Section: A Technical Conceptsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The IBV satisfies the additivity, symmetry, anonymity, invariance, null player property, and dummy player property [10]. For example, let < 𝑁, πœˆΜ… > be a cooperative interval game with 𝑁 = {1, 2, 3} and πœˆΜ… (1) = πœˆΜ… (13) = [7,7] , πœˆΜ… (12) = [12,17] , πœˆΜ… (123) = [24, 29] and πœˆΜ… (𝑆) = [0,0] otherwise.…”
Section: A C-mec Platform Architecture and Cooperative Game Modelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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