A DRAM based physical unclonable function capable of generating &gt;10<sup>32</sup> Challenge Response Pairs per 1Kbit array for secure chip authentication

Tang, Qianying; Zhou, Chen; Choi, Woong; Kang, Gyuseong; Parhi, Keshab K.; Kim, Chris H.

doi:10.1109/cicc.2017.7993610

Cited by 21 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Nevertheless, the ring oscillator PUF, a delay-based PUF, has been described in some publications as a "weak" PUF [32] and in others as a "strong" one [35]. Additionally, as we discuss in other sections, DRAM PUFs can quite often provide multiple CRPs, and even a very large number of them [11]. However, in this work, we refrain from judging whether the different DRAM-based PUFs are "weak" or "strong", and only examine the amount of CRPs that they can potentially allow for, which we sometimes proceed to compare to the single CRP that most SRAM PUF implementations provide.…”

Section: Physical Unclonable Functionsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…However, apart from DRAMs with cells consisting of one transistor and one capacitor (1T1C), as the one shown in Figure 1, there are also other DRAM implementations, such as purpose-built embedded DRAMs, with cells consisting of only two transistors (2T) [10,11]. In these, the storage capacitor is replaced by a storage transistor connected to a transistor that allows access for writing.…”

Section: Dynamic Random Access Memoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Tang et al [11] presented a DRAM PUF based on the retention characteristic of DRAM cells, utilising the location of cells with a weak retention characteristic in a 65 nm 2T Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor (CMOS) eDRAM. In this case, multiple locations of the DRAM are utilised to produce the PUF's final response, as their error patterns are combined in the final response.…”

Section: Brief Literature Taxonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Overview of DRAM-Based Security Primitives

et al. 2018

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Recent developments have increased the demand for adequate security solutions, based on primitives that cannot be easily manipulated or altered, such as hardware-based primitives. Security primitives based on Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) can provide cost-efficient and practical security solutions, especially for resource-constrained devices, such as hardware used in the Internet of Things (IoT), as DRAMs are an intrinsic part of most contemporary computer systems. In this work, we present a comprehensive overview of the literature regarding DRAM-based security primitives and an extended classification of it, based on a number of different criteria. In particular, first, we demonstrate the way in which DRAMs work and present the characteristics being exploited for the implementation of security primitives. Then, we introduce the primitives that can be implemented using DRAM, namely Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and True Random Number Generators (TRNGs), and present the applications of each of the two types of DRAM-based security primitives. We additionally proceed to assess the security such primitives can provide, by discussing potential attacks and defences, as well as the proposed security metrics. Subsequently, we also compare these primitives to other hardware-based security primitives, noting their advantages and shortcomings, and proceed to demonstrate their potential for commercial adoption. Finally, we analyse our classification methodology, by reviewing the criteria employed in our classification and examining their significance.

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Section: Physical Unclonable Functionsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Dynamic Random Access Memoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Brief Literature Taxonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Overview of DRAM-Based Security Primitives

et al. 2018

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“…• Pattern Dependent Cells: The output patterns for these cells are different for different input patterns. Therefore, these cells can be the ideal candidates for the PUF that possesses enhanced challenge-response pair [61]- [63].…”

Section: B Characterizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

PreLatPUF: Exploiting DRAM Latency Variations for Generating Robust Device Signatures

et al. 2019

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Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are potential security blocks to generate unique and more secure keys in low-cost cryptographic applications. Dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) has been proposed as one of the promising candidates for generating robust keys. Unfortunately, the existing techniques of generating device signatures from DRAM is very slow, destructive (destroy the current data), and disruptive to system operation. In this paper, we propose precharge latency-based PUF (PreLatPUF) that exploits DRAM precharge latency variations to generate signatures. The proposed PreLatPUF is fast, robust, least disruptive, and non-destructive. The silicon results from commercially available DDR3 chips from different manufacturers show that the proposed key generation technique is at least ∼ 1, 192X faster than the existing approaches, while reliably reproducing the key in extreme operating conditions. INDEX TERMS DRAM-PUF, DRAM latency-based PUF, robust key generation.

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“…On the other hand, the output of pattern dependent cells depends on the initially written data pattern at the reduced t RP . With proper processing, pattern dependent cells might be used as a strong PUFs [23]. • Noisy Cells: The output of noisy cells varies from measurement to measurement and do not show any consistency with the initially written data pattern.…”

Section: A Dram Cells Characterizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploiting DRAM Latency Variations for Generating True Random Numbers

Talukder

Kerns

Ray

et al. 2019

2019 IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE)

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True random number generator (TRNG) plays a vital role in a variety of security applications and protocols. The security and privacy of an asset rely on the encryption, which solely depends on the quality of random numbers. Memory chips are widely used for generating random numbers because of their prevalence in modern electronic systems. Unfortunately, existing Dynamic Random-access Memory (DRAM)-based TRNGs produce random numbers with either limited entropy or poor throughput. In this paper, we propose a DRAM-latency based TRNG that generates high-quality random numbers. The silicon results from Samsung and Micron DDR3 DRAM modules show that our proposed DRAM-latency based TRNG is robust (against different operating conditions and environmental variations) and acceptably fast.Index Terms-Random number, TRNG, DRAM-based security primitives, DRAM-based TRNG, Memory-based security primitives, Memory-based TRNG, hardware-based security primitives.

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A DRAM based physical unclonable function capable of generating >10³² Challenge Response Pairs per 1Kbit array for secure chip authentication

Cited by 21 publications

References 5 publications

An Overview of DRAM-Based Security Primitives

An Overview of DRAM-Based Security Primitives

PreLatPUF: Exploiting DRAM Latency Variations for Generating Robust Device Signatures

Exploiting DRAM Latency Variations for Generating True Random Numbers

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A DRAM based physical unclonable function capable of generating >1032 Challenge Response Pairs per 1Kbit array for secure chip authentication

Cited by 21 publications

References 5 publications

An Overview of DRAM-Based Security Primitives

An Overview of DRAM-Based Security Primitives

PreLatPUF: Exploiting DRAM Latency Variations for Generating Robust Device Signatures

Exploiting DRAM Latency Variations for Generating True Random Numbers

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A DRAM based physical unclonable function capable of generating >10³² Challenge Response Pairs per 1Kbit array for secure chip authentication