A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice

Abstract

This article develops a simultaneous equation model of the voting decision in a form thought to mirror the main lines of cognitive decision-making processes of individual voters. The model goes beyond earlier efforts in two respects. First, it explicitly represents the causal interdependence of voter assessments in the election situation, permitting such estimations as the degree to which correlations between voter issue positions and issue positions ascribed to preferred candidates arise because of projection onto the candidate or persuasion by the candidate. Secondly, the model is truly dynamic, in the sense that it is dependent on longitudinal data for its proper estimation. The utility of the model is certified by the goodness of fit achieved when applied to 1972–76 panel data for a sample of the national electorate.

A Reference Group Theory of Partisan Coalitions

“…A separate but similar multivariate analysis predicting thermometer ratings of the presidential candidates for 1972 and 1984 produced results comparable to those for partisan evaluations (see table 4). The fact that recent models of candidate choice (Page and Jones 1979;Markus and Converse 1979) do not include group evaluations suggests that these models are misspecified, since group affect was equally as strong as party identification in predicting candidate support. In short, how people feel about particular social groups not only structures their political cognitions and partisan orientation, it also influences the presidential candidates they prefer.…”

Party brands and voting

“…Indeed, the issue of causality is relevant to all theories on voting; it is nevertheless imperative for researchers to determine if a firmer connection can be established between brand and behavior. To do so we need to go further than simply controlling for other relevant variables when searching for causal order in the electoral universe (Page and Jones, 1979;Markus and Converse, 1979;Bartels, 2010). Otherwise, we will be forced to follow old orthodoxies and assumptions, rather than giving all variables an equal footing in explaining voting behavior.…”

Policy Voting, Projection, and Persuasion: An Application of Balance Theory to Electoral Behavior

“…First, it may take the form of projection. The voter favors a candidate on other grounds than issue position and assumes that the favorite candidate agrees with him on the issues ; at the same time a "reverse" projection may occur to the extent that the voter ascribes to a candidate, whom he already dislikes on other grounds, those issue positions that the voter himself rejects (Markus & Converse, 1979).…”

“…The voter decides on a candidate for other reasons than issue positions and conforms his own issue opinions to those of the selected candidate ; again a reverse form of persuasion may be discerned in that a voter adapts his own issue stands in contradiction to those of a candidate already negatively evaluated on other grounds (Markus & Converse, 1979). 'Note that these processes of rationalization may also be described in terms of assimilation and contrast.…”

“…Persuasion involves the assimilation of the issue opinions of the voter's favorite candidate to the voter's own positions; projection is the assimilation of the voter's own issue stands to those of his liked candidate. Their reversals indicate a contrasting of the voter's own issue positions to those In a number of subsequent articles it was attempted to separate the rational voters from the rationalizers (Page & Jones, 1979;Markus & Converse, 1979; for a review see Niemi & Weisberg, 1984). In a methodological sense, the processes of projection and persuasion imply reciprocity in the causal relationships between the different factors leading to the voting choice, a reversal of the causal order which the different researchers capture through the specification of nonrecursive, simultaneous equation models.…”