A Fast and Scalable Payment Network with Bitcoin Duplex Micropayment Channels

Decker, Christian; Wattenhofer, Roger

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-21741-3_1

Cited by 381 publications

(281 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…The core idea was to use unidirectional channels with a predefined sender and receiver. Later, various constructions for bidirectional payment channels were proposed [6,9,10,14,17]. They all use a common account for the parties and off-chain exchange of signed transactions proving the state of the channel.…”

Section: The Fee Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Payment Networks as Creation Games

Avarikioti

Scheuner

Wattenhofer

2019

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Payment networks were introduced to address the limitation on the transaction throughput of popular blockchains. To open a payment channel one has to publish a transaction on-chain and pay the appropriate transaction fee. A transaction can be routed in the network, as long as there is a path of channels with the necessary capital. The intermediate nodes on this path can ask for a fee to forward the transaction. Hence, opening channels, although costly, can benefit a party, both by reducing the cost of the party for sending a transaction and by collecting the fees from forwarding transactions of other parties. This trade-off spawns a network creation game between the channel parties. In this work, we introduce the first game theoretic model for analyzing the network creation game on blockchain payment channels. Further, we examine various network structures (path, star, complete bipartite graph and clique) and determine for each one of them the constraints (fee value) under which they constitute a Nash equilibrium, given a fixed fee policy. Last, we show that the star is a Nash equilibrium when each channel party can freely decide the channel fee. On the other hand, we prove the complete bipartite graph can never be a Nash equilibrium, given a free fee policy.

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Section: The Fee Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Payment Networks as Creation Games

Avarikioti

Scheuner

Wattenhofer

2019

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…In a rapidly evolving technology such as blockchain is nowadays, these limits are often changed by the development teams behind some of these systems. An example is the implementation (or not) of SegWit2x and Lightning (as technology for micropayment channels) (Decker and Wattenhofer, 2015) as ways to alleviate the limitation in the number of transactions that Bitcoin can process with respect to its current implementation.…”

Section: E Limits To Scalabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Ontology of Blockchain Technologies. Principles of Identification and Classification

Tasca¹,

Tessone

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…For off-chain approaches, the relevant persons publish a cosigned contract at the beginning and the end of the relationship. Then they do the trading securely through off-chain channels [23], [24] without publishing transactions to the blockchain. They only publish the transactions to the blockchain when one violates the off-chain transactions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Segment Blockchain: A Size Reduced Storage Mechanism for Blockchain

Huang

2020

IEEE Access

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The exponential growth of the blockchain size has become a major contributing factor that hinders the decentralisation of blockchain and its potential implementations in dataheavy applications. In this paper, we propose segment blockchain, an approach that segmentises blockchain and enables nodes to only store a copy of one blockchain segment. We use PoW as a membership threshold to limit the number of nodes taken by an Adversary-the Adversary can only gain at most n/2 of nodes in a network of n nodes when it has 50% of the calculation power in the system (the Nakamoto blockchain security threshold). A segment blockchain system fails when an Adversary stores all copies of a segment, because the Adversary can then leave the system, causing a permanent loss of the segment. We theoretically prove that segment blockchain can sustain a (AD/n) m failure probability when the Adversary has no more than AD number of nodes and every segment is stored by m number of nodes. The storage requirement is mostly shrunken compared to the traditional design and therefore making the blockchain more suitable for data-heavy applications.

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A Fast and Scalable Payment Network with Bitcoin Duplex Micropayment Channels

Cited by 381 publications

References 6 publications

Payment Networks as Creation Games

Payment Networks as Creation Games

Ontology of Blockchain Technologies. Principles of Identification and Classification

Segment Blockchain: A Size Reduced Storage Mechanism for Blockchain

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