2016
DOI: 10.1109/tvlsi.2016.2548561
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A Fine-Grained Control Flow Integrity Approach Against Runtime Memory Attacks for Embedded Systems

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Cited by 50 publications
(26 citation statements)
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“…In fact, when these techniques are correctly implemented, they prevent or mitigate stack smashing attacks, execution of return-2-x [7] and return-oriented programming (ROP) [8][9][10][11] attack and code injection, respectively. Other techniques such as Flow Control Integrity [12], SmashClean [13] and Timing Channel Protection [14] have also been proven effective.…”
Section: Related Work On Memory Protection Architecturesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In fact, when these techniques are correctly implemented, they prevent or mitigate stack smashing attacks, execution of return-2-x [7] and return-oriented programming (ROP) [8][9][10][11] attack and code injection, respectively. Other techniques such as Flow Control Integrity [12], SmashClean [13] and Timing Channel Protection [14] have also been proven effective.…”
Section: Related Work On Memory Protection Architecturesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Lee hardware CRA monitor in an ARM-based SoC to detect ROP and JOP attacks through a system debug interface to trace outcomes [7]. However, these monitor measures [8] can only monitor such attacks, but can't provide effective defense strategies.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…AES process 8-bit state in finite field arithmetic on GF(2 8 ) elements. The most common approach for the four steps is using lookup tables initialed by the aimed results.…”
Section: Aes Engine With Composite Field Arithmeticmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Classic methods extract control flow paths or signatures of basic blocks in static and write them into binaries or store in a special memory. When one program is being executed, an extra hardware component validates control flow paths to ensure the program run correctly [ 12 , 13 ]. One typical method is SIS (Signatured Instruction Streams).…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%