A Form of Ideational Apraxia as a Delective Deficit of Contention Scheduling

Rumiati, Raffaella I.; Zanini, Sergio; Vorano, Lorenza; Shallice, Tim

doi:10.1080/02643290126375

Cited by 121 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…It also is in line with the results from neuropsychological studies showing that damage to various parts of the motor system such as the basal ganglia (43,44), the inferior parietal lobe (43)(44)(45), the inferior frontal gyrus (43,45,46), the left premotor cortex (43,45), the primary motor cortex (43,45), and the bilateral superior parietal lobule (46) cause motor or praxis disorders (a disorder affecting the capacity to perform actions despite preserved basic motor and somatosensory functions) but do not necessarily hamper action identification.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 74%

Typical action perception and interpretation without motor simulation

Vannuscorps

Caramazza

2015

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Every day, we interact with people synchronously, immediately understand what they are doing, and easily infer their mental state and the likely outcome of their actions from their kinematics. According to various motor simulation theories of perception, such efficient perceptual processing of others' actions cannot be achieved by visual analysis of the movements alone but requires a process of motor simulation-an unconscious, covert imitation of the observed movements. According to this hypothesis, individuals incapable of simulating observed movements in their motor system should have difficulty perceiving and interpreting observed actions. Contrary to this prediction, we found across eight sensitive experiments that individuals born with absent or severely shortened upper limbs (upper limb dysplasia), despite some variability, could perceive, anticipate, predict, comprehend, and memorize upper limb actions, which they cannot simulate, as efficiently as typically developed participants. We also found that, like the typically developed participants, the dysplasic participants systematically perceived the position of moving upper limbs slightly ahead of their real position but only when the anticipated position was not biomechanically awkward. Such anticipatory bias and its modulation by implicit knowledge of the body biomechanical constraints were previously considered as indexes of the crucial role of motor simulation in action perception. Our findings undermine this assumption and the theories that place the locus of action perception and comprehension in the motor system and invite a shift in the focus of future research to the question of how the visuo-perceptual system represents and processes observed body movements and actions.action perception | motor simulation | mirror neurons O ur social life rests in large part on our capacity to perceive and interpret others' behavior accurately to anticipate their upcoming actions and adjust our own behavior appropriately. The impairment of this ability in the context of autism, schizophrenia, various types of dementia, or following stroke or head injury has tragic consequences for both patients and society. However, how the human mind and brain supports these abilities remains a major challenge. In this study, we addressed a specific issue regarding the relationship between visual and motor processes in action perception and recognition: Does efficient perception and interpretation of action rely on unconscious, covert motor simulation of the observed movements?The traditional view on this issue is that efficient perception and interpretation of human movement does not rely on motor simulation but rather on computations occurring in the visuoperceptual system supported by basic perceptual processes and information extrapolated from perceptual learning (1-5). This view has been challenged by a series of motor simulation theories of perception which, despite their differences, all assume that efficient perceptual processing of others' actions cannot be achieved by ...

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 74%

Typical action perception and interpretation without motor simulation

Vannuscorps

Caramazza

2015

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…Surprisingly, there is no clear quantitative study differentiating the properties of these types of patient. However, as discussed above, Rumiati et al (2001) described two ideational apraxic patients with tendencies toward different types of error. Extrapolation from qualitative differences between the patterns of disorder exhibited by patients to qualitative differences between loci of impairment can be somewhat hazardous (see, e.g., Plaut, 1995;Shallice, 1988; but see Bullinaria, 2003).…”

Section: Dissociations Between Individual Patients and Between Patienmentioning

confidence: 87%

Hierarchical schemas and goals in the control of sequential behavior.

Cooper¹,

Shallice²

2006

Psychological Review

Self Cite

221

248

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Traditional accounts of sequential behavior assume that schemas and goals play a causal role in the control of behavior. In contrast, M. Botvinick and D. C. Plaut (2004) argued that, at least in routine behavior, schemas and goals are epiphenomenal. The authors evaluate the Botvinick and Plaut account by contrasting the simple recurrent network model of Botvinick and Plaut with their own more traditional hierarchically structured interactive activation model (R. P. Cooper & T. Shallice, 2000). The authors present a range of arguments and additional simulations that demonstrate theoretical and empirical difficulties for both Botvinick and Plaut's model and their theoretical position. The authors conclude that explicit hierarchically organized and causally efficacious schema and goal representations are required to provide an adequate account of the flexibility of sequential behavior.Keywords: control of routine behavior, localist versus distributed representations, simple recurrent networks, neuropsychological impairments of action It has become a commonplace in many areas of psychology over the past 50 years that there exist discrete representations that correspond to qualitatively different states of the organism. The accessing, activation, or selection in some other way of one of these states rather than another is held to have qualitatively different effects on the selection of subsequent states and of subsequent behavior. Moreover, the selection of the current state is held to be the result of the effecting of discrete operations or rules, typically by analogy with a computer program.More recently, there has been a challenge to this perspective. It has been strongly argued that this assumed discreteness both of the representations and of the structures that select them arises from the familiarity of such concepts in other domains (e.g., computer science) rather than reflecting the operation of the underlying mechanism in the human mind. Instead, the apparent discreteness reflects inputs or outputs rather than the states of the internal mechanisms, which are better represented as regions or trajectories within continuous state spaces created by connectionist networks.The core issues in the debate, which has raged since 1985 (e.g., Broadbent, 1985;Pinker & Prince, 1988; etc.), have principally concerned areas in psycholinguistics and neurolinguistics where the existence of discrete representations (e.g., phonemes, morphemes) and of discrete operators (syntactic rules) was made plausible by developments in independent disciplines such as phonology and linguistics (e.g., Chomsky, 1957Chomsky, , 1980Chomsky & Halle, 1968). In addition, the debate has concerned areas where rule-based mappings had already been postulated on other grounds, as in spelling-to-sound translation in reading (e.g., Coltheart, Curtis, Atkins, & Haller, 1993;Plaut, McClelland, Seidenberg, & Patterson, 1996;Wijk, 1966; see also Zorzi, Houghton, & Butterworth, 1998).However, despite over 15 years of research in these areas, it would be premat...

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“…There is no doubt that the ability to use objects can be disrupted when conceptual knowledge about them is preserved (Rumiati et al, 2001;Spatt et al, 2002). All such reported cases can, we think, be explained by frank nonsemantic apraxic disorders.…”

Section: Preserved Object Use In the Context Of Degraded Semantic Knomentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Several patients have been reported in the literature who were unable to use real objects correctly despite having preserved knowledge about those same objects (Rumiati, Zanini, Vorano, & Shallice, 2001;Spatt, Bak, Bozeat, Patterson, & Hodges, 2002). These patients invariably had some level of ideomotor apraxia associated with damage to parietal regions, which left them unable to produce the movements appropriate for object use.…”

Section: Impaired Object Use In the Context Of Preserved Semantic Knomentioning

confidence: 99%

When objects lose their meaning: What happens to their use?

Bozeat

Ralph

Patterson

et al. 2002

Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience

156

143

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The 8 patients involved in this study were impaired on tests assessing knowledge of objects and on the demonstration of their use. The patients' success in object use was significantly correlated with their knowledge about the objects, providing further evidence that conceptual knowledge plays a key role in object use. Having a recipient present improved performance in the moderately impaired patients, suggesting that a certain level of conceptual knowledge must remain for the additional information to be beneficial. Although overall accuracy in using the target objects was not related to our measures of affordance, the specific aspects of use afforded by the objects' structures were relatively impervious to semantic impairment, suggesting a role for affordance information when object-specific knowledge is disrupted. The patients' familiarity with the objects was an important predictor of performance. Finally, despite good performance on tests of mechanical problem solving, the patients showed very little evidence of employing these skills in their interactions with real objects.

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A Form of Ideational Apraxia as a Delective Deficit of Contention Scheduling

Cited by 121 publications

References 26 publications

Typical action perception and interpretation without motor simulation

Typical action perception and interpretation without motor simulation

Hierarchical schemas and goals in the control of sequential behavior.

When objects lose their meaning: What happens to their use?

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