A Formally Verified NAT Stack

Pirelli, Solal; Zaostrovnykh, Arseniy; Candea, George

doi:10.1145/3229538.3229540

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…To date, the relevant systems and methods are either (a) automatically tested but not formally verified, (b) use verification approaches which rely on automatic extraction from executable specifications (for example involving network stack synthesis [4], optimizing compilers [5], cryptographic libraries [6], and encoder/decoders [7]), or (c) apply a form of formal verification which only proves partial correctness properties (partial verification of NAT stack proving that only parts of DPDK are specification compliant [8], partial verification of Linux kernel TCP implementation with 55% line coverage and 92% protocol coverage [9]). Consequently, (a) and (c) do not provide sufficient correctness guarantees, while (b) is often impractical due to poor performance and compatibility limitations.…”

Section: Our Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research Report: Formally-Verified ASN.1 Protocol C-language Stack

Pona¹,

Zaliva

2020

2020 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)

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We describe our approach and progress in verification of a mature open-source ASN.1 compiler, ASN1C, using the Coq proof assistant. Once completed, our project will provide state-of-the-art high assurance suitable for mission-critical systems. Furthermore, since formal verification will be layered atop a well-tested ASN.1 stack, it will combine the benefits of high-performance portable stack implementation with formal correctness guarantees. As an essential step in our approach, the project will also provide a formalization of a key part of the ASN.1 standard. Such formal specification could subsequently be used by others to analyze ASN.1 properties and validate other implementations.

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Section: Our Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research Report: Formally-Verified ASN.1 Protocol C-language Stack

Pona¹,

Zaliva

2020

2020 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)

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“…Of the eight bugs we found in DPDK and the driver, six were confirmed by the DPDK maintainers and four have been fixed at the time of writing. We first reported these bugs in [38].…”

Section: Does Verification Have Tangible Benefits?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Verifying software network functions with no verification expertise

Zaostrovnykh

Pirelli

Iyer

et al. 2019

Proceedings of the 27th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles

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We present the design and implementation of Vigor, a software stack and toolchain for building and running software network middleboxes that are guaranteed to be correct, while preserving competitive performance and developer productivity. Developers write the core of the middlebox-the network function (NF)-in C, on top of a standard packet-processing framework, putting persistent state in data structures from Vigor's library; the Vigor toolchain then automatically verifies that the resulting software stack correctly implements a specification, which is written in Python. Vigor has three key features: network function developers need no verification expertise, and the verification process does not require their assistance (push-button verification); the entire software stack is verified, down to the hardware (full-stack verification); and verification can be done in a payas-you-go manner, i.e., instead of investing upfront a lot of time in writing and verifying a complete specification, one can specify one-off properties in a few lines of Python and verify them without concern for the rest. We developed five representative NFs-a NAT, a Maglev load balancer, a MAC-learning bridge, a firewall, and a traffic policer-and verified with Vigor that they satisfy standardsderived specifications, are memory-safe, and do not crash or hang. We show that they provide competitive performance.

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Local Reasoning About the Presence of Bugs: Incorrectness Separation Logic

Raad

Berdine

Dang

et al. 2020

Computer Aided Verification

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There has been a large body of work on local reasoning for proving the absence of bugs, but none for proving their presence . We present a new formal framework for local reasoning about the presence of bugs, building on two complementary foundations: 1) separation logic and 2) incorrectness logic. We explore the theory of this new incorrectness separation logic (ISL), and use it to derive a begin-anywhere, intra-procedural symbolic execution analysis that has no false positives by construction . In so doing, we take a step towards transferring modular, scalable techniques from the world of program verification to bug catching.

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A Formally Verified NAT Stack

Cited by 3 publications

References 3 publications

Research Report: Formally-Verified ASN.1 Protocol C-language Stack

Research Report: Formally-Verified ASN.1 Protocol C-language Stack

Verifying software network functions with no verification expertise

Local Reasoning About the Presence of Bugs: Incorrectness Separation Logic

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