We present a Network Address Translator (NAT) written in C and proven to be semantically correct according to RFC 3022, as well as crash-free and memory-safe. There exists a lot of recent work on network verification, but it mostly assumes models of network functions and proves properties specific to network configuration, such as reachability and absence of loops. Our proof applies directly to the C code of a network function, and it demonstrates the absence of implementation bugs. Prior work argued that this is not feasible (i.e., that verifying a real, stateful network function written in C does not scale) but we demonstrate otherwise: NAT is one of the most popular network functions and maintains per-flow state that needs to be properly updated and expired, which is a typical source of verification challenges. We tackle the scalability challenge with a new combination of symbolic execution and proof checking using separation logic; this combination matches well the typical structure of a network function. We then demonstrate that formally proven correctness in this case does not come at the cost of performance. The NAT code, proof toolchain, and proofs are available at [58].

We present the design and implementation of Vigor, a software stack and toolchain for building and running software network middleboxes that are guaranteed to be correct, while preserving competitive performance and developer productivity. Developers write the core of the middlebox-the network function (NF)-in C, on top of a standard packet-processing framework, putting persistent state in data structures from Vigor's library; the Vigor toolchain then automatically verifies that the resulting software stack correctly implements a specification, which is written in Python. Vigor has three key features: network function developers need no verification expertise, and the verification process does not require their assistance (push-button verification); the entire software stack is verified, down to the hardware (full-stack verification); and verification can be done in a payas-you-go manner, i.e., instead of investing upfront a lot of time in writing and verifying a complete specification, one can specify one-off properties in a few lines of Python and verify them without concern for the rest. We developed five representative NFs-a NAT, a Maglev load balancer, a MAC-learning bridge, a firewall, and a traffic policer-and verified with Vigor that they satisfy standardsderived specifications, are memory-safe, and do not crash or hang. We show that they provide competitive performance.

Prior work proved a stateful NAT network function to be semantically correct, crash-free, and memory safe [29]. Their toolchain verifies the network function code while assuming the underlying kernel-bypass framework, drivers, operating system, and hardware to be correct. We extend the toolchain to verify the kernel-bypass framework and a NIC driver in the context of the NAT. We uncover bugs in both the framework and the driver. Our code is publicly available [28].We patch DPDK to fix some bugs and make verification easier, but this does not affect the performance of the NAT. We evaluate the resulting NAT end-to-end in §5.We present limitations and ideas for future work in §6, discuss related work in §7, and conclude in §8.

Developers write low-level systems code in unsafe programming languages due to performance concerns. The lack of safety causes bugs and vulnerabilities that safe languages avoid. We argue that safety without run-time overhead is possible through type invariants that prove the safety of potentially unsafe operations. We empirically show that Rust and C# can be extended with such features to implement safe network device drivers without run-time overhead, and that Ada has these features already.