A Framework for Social Ontology

Abstract

This paper sets out an organizing framework for the field of social ontology, the study of the nature of the social world. The subject matter of social ontology is clarified, in particular the difference between it and the study of causal relations and the explanation of social phenomena. Two different inquiries are defined and explained: the study of the grounding of social facts, and the study of how social categories are “anchored” or set up. The distinction between these inquiries is used to clarify prominent programs in social theory, particularly theories of practice and varieties of individualism.

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“…Social ontology is 'the subfield at the intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of social science that investigates the nature of the social world'. 50 Its task 'is broader than cataloguing what entities exist: we want an account of how the social world is built'. 51 It is submitted that critical legal science needs to build its own account of the nature of the social world, and specifically of the juridical field, which is in the focus of its interest, in order to organise its research endeavours.…”

“…49 In Norway, legal theorists came up with a conclusion that case law did not have a normative binding effect, but at the same time claimed that it was a formal source of law. 50 In other words, the current notion and definition of formal sources law is vague and the criteria for including some entity between sources of law are not applied uniformly among individual legal systems, even among those who are a part of the civil law system family. It is not a failure of those legal theorists to interpret the concept of formal sources of law correctly.…”

Institutions as dispositions: Searle, Smith and the metaphysics of blind chess

“…These properly metaphysical questions are related to, but distinct from, questions about the ontology or the logical structure of institutional reality – a distinction which closely mirrors Lawson's distinction between social philosophical ontology and social scientific ontology (Lawson, ). Epstein () distinguishes a narrower ontological field of enquiry in a Quinean inventory‐style‐approach from broader metaphysical questions, and Searle often talks about the logical structure of society – cf. “[...] society has a logical (conceptual, propositional) structure that admits of, indeed requires, logical analysis.” (Searle, , p. 6), and at numerous points in (Searle, ).…”

Critique of the “Juridical”: Some Metatheoretical Remarks

“…Only then will it be possible, first of all, to identify which scientific approaches can be deemed to represent critical legal science, and secondly, to undertake such research in full conscience (starting out from criticism, as critique in itself, to a critique for itself ). 11 Consequently, the present article will discuss the following conceptual issues. Firstly, it will attempt to give an answer to the question on the nature of legal critique, namely, where the critical element of critical legal science is the same as in other critical theories, or is it different (specific for the juridical field).…”