A framework for understanding reasoning errors: From fake news to climate change and beyond

Abstract

Humans have the capacity, but perhaps not always the willingness, for great intelligence. From global warming to the spread of misinformation and beyond, our species is facing several major challenges that are the result of the limits of our own reasoning and decision-making. So, why are we so prone to errors during reasoning? In this chapter, I will outline a framework for understanding reasoning errors that is based on a three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement (intuition, metacognition, and reason). The model has two key implications: 1) That a mere lack of deliberation and analytic thinking is a primary source of errors and 2) That when deliberation is activated, it generally reduces errors (via questioning intuitions and integrating new information) than increasing errors (via rationalization and motivated reasoning). In support of these claims, I review research showing the extensive predictive validity of measures that index individual differences in analytic cognitive style – even beyond explicit errors per se. In particular, analytic thinking is not only predictive of skepticism about a wide range of epistemically suspect beliefs (paranormal, conspiratorial, COVID-19 misperceptions, pseudoscience and alternative medicines) as well as decreased susceptibility to bullshit, fake news, and misinformation, but also important differences in people’s moral judgments and values as well as their religious beliefs (and disbeliefs). Furthermore, in some (but not all cases), there is evidence from experimental paradigms that support a causal role of analytic thinking in determining judgments, beliefs, and behaviors. The findings reviewed here provide some reason for optimism for the future: It may be possible to foster analytic thinking and therefore improve the quality of our decisions.

Thinking more or thinking differently? Using drift-diffusion modeling to illuminate why accuracy prompts decrease misinformation sharing

“…Crucially, our approach allows us to test the predictions of popular dual-process theories, which often assume that thinking more should be associated with thinking better. Namely, the key prediction is that prompting people to consider accuracy is effective specifically because it increases deliberation (which has been shown to facilitate evaluation of the accuracy of news; Pennycook, 2022;Pennycook & Rand, 2019).…”

Motivated Cognition in Cooperation

“…This adaptive function of motivated cognition might also explain why some studies have found that higher cognitive abilities go along with a higher, not lower, propensity to display biased belief updating (Da Silva et al, 2019;Kahan, 2012;Kahan et al, 2012;Knobloch-Westerwick et al, 2020;Saunders, 2017;Strömbäck et al, 2021;Szebeni et al, 2021). However, others who tested this link between cognitive abilities and motivated cognition found no evidence of this relationship (Fischer et al, 2022;Pennycook, 2022;Pennycook & Rand, 2019).…”

The impact of information disorder on deliberative process

“…In System II, information is carefully elaborated with more time for reflection. In a scenario of information disorder, there are several pitfalls that lead us to incorrect decisions about what is true and false (Cook et al, 2019;Koch et al, 2023;Lewandowsky, 2021;Lewandowsky et al, 2022;Pennycook, 2022). People fail in judgment because they do not pause to reflect sufficiently on their prior knowledge or have insufficient or inaccurate prior knowledge (Pennycook, 2022).…”