A Game Analysis of Trade Dumping and Antidumping

Abstract

This paper develops game theoretical models to study the interactive, competitive plays and relevant decision making regarding the dumping and antidumping actions between an importing nation and an exporting nation. The latter considers potentially dumping its product in the domestic market of the former, while the former attempts to protect its market and its domestic firms from exiting the market by implementing necessary trading strategies. Understanding how to deal with potential intruders, when to take actions, and what appropriate actions to take under different sets of conditions is very crucial both theoretically and practically, because countermeasures may or may not be effective depending on what conditions one is constrained with. The theoretical framework, established in this paper, will provide a better understanding of anti-dumping policies and their implications for regulators, policy makers, managers, and academicians, while the results developed herein can be readily employed in real-life scenarios, making this work practically useful for understanding how international trade conflicts could be handled effectively.

Factors and Steps for Successful Transition from a State of Making to One of Innovating

“…As for the question of how markets stimulate innovation, the following result is shown by Zhao et al [49]. In other words, market demands invite economic entities to compete through innovation.…”

Technological and Disruptive Innovations in a Nation's Industrialization and Leadership Development

“…The following is a restatement of Theorem 1 with all normalizations from Lemmas 1-5 removed. The omitted proof can be constructed according to that of Theorem 1 in Zhao et al (2018). Note: This result only talks about market competitions without addressing what the government is concerned about, to this end, one example is (Aslani et al, 2018), where the macro-level complexity of the natural gas energy system is studied, while showing how affordability, acceptability, and reliability of energy supply are key concerns of the government.…”

“…By emerging and rising alongside the expanding market, such a nation will conveniently become a leader in the relevant international arena. As for whether or not there is a need for intellectual property protection in order for this conclusion to hold true, the anecdotal-based research of McGrath (2013) on competitive advantages and the game-theory-based work of Zhao et al (2018) on trade dumping and anti-dumping demonstrate that such protection is not needed due to the reasons that all competitive advantages have become transient and that antidumping measures simply do not work in a globalizing market. For partial, empirical confirmations relevant to this proposition, see, for example, Markides and Geroski (2005).…”