2013
DOI: 10.1007/s12544-013-0116-y
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A game theoretic model for re-optimizing a railway timetable

Abstract: The Setting In the Nineties of the last century the European Commission decided to open the railway market to competition, allowing different railway companies to operate on the same network. Under this framework Infrastructure Managers have to allocate capacity in order to define the timetable, dealing with possible slot conflicts between competing Transport Operators. The Problem An efficient train scheduling requires collecting a lot of information from the Transport Operators, but it may not be in their in… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Also, some principles of natural swarm intelligence in the development of artifcial systems can be used to solve the complex multiagent system in transportation planning and management [27], including but not limited to the railway industry. In the background of competitive railway market in 1990s, the authors in [28] proposed a game theoretical model for a coalition formation problem. Also, the agents (i.e., transport operators) in the model could exchange information on their needs and be rewarded by a possible increasing of their utility.…”
Section: Paper Reviews By Adversarialmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Also, some principles of natural swarm intelligence in the development of artifcial systems can be used to solve the complex multiagent system in transportation planning and management [27], including but not limited to the railway industry. In the background of competitive railway market in 1990s, the authors in [28] proposed a game theoretical model for a coalition formation problem. Also, the agents (i.e., transport operators) in the model could exchange information on their needs and be rewarded by a possible increasing of their utility.…”
Section: Paper Reviews By Adversarialmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…performance assessment [60] delay pattern recognition [61] train dispatching [62] Y: train rescheduling [63] Y train timetabling [64] Revenue management U P: revenue forecasting [65] RM system design [66] U P: RM simulation [67] pricing [68] Transport policy P:…”
Section: A Existing Applicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A nontransferable utility game theoretical study is proposed by Fragnelli and Sanguineti (2014), who examine the need for information exchange for cooperative timetabling among multiple train operators. Companies exchange preferences about their needs and get compensation under limited information disclosure.…”
Section: Game Theoretical Studies In Transit Ormentioning
confidence: 99%