A game-theory approach to configuration of detection software with decision errors

Gao, Xing; Wang, Zhong; Mei, Shue

doi:10.1016/j.ress.2013.05.004

Cited by 18 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…The framework we consider is common to military weapon target engagements (Aviv & Kress, 1997;Kisi, 1976;Mastran & Thomas, 1973), shooting problems (Glazebrook & Washburn, 2004;Sato, 1997a), cybersecurity (Gao, Zhong, & Mei, 2013;Hu, Xu, Xu, & Zhao, 2017), attacker-defender games (Levitin & Hausken, 2012), and more broadly to stochastic sequential resource allocation (Sato, 1996(Sato, , 1997b. In sequential assignment problems of the kind considered herein, the decision rule usually takes the form, attack the target iff its value is no less than a certain threshold c, where the optimal c is to be determined.…”

Section: Prior Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A sequential partial information bomber‐defender shooting problem

Kalyanam

Casbeer

Pachter

2020

Naval Research Logistics

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A bomber carrying homogenous weapons sequentially engages ground targets capable of retaliation. Upon reaching a target, the bomber may fire a weapon at it. If the target survives the direct fire, it can either return fire or choose to hold fire (play dead). If the former occurs, the bomber is immediately made aware that the target is alive. If no return fire is seen, the true status of the target is unknown to the bomber. After the current engagement, the bomber, if still alive, can either re‐engage the same target or move on to the next target in the sequence. The bomber seeks to maximize the expected cumulative damage it can inflict on the targets. We solve the perfect and partial information problems, where a target always fires back and sometimes fires back respectively using stochastic dynamic programming. The perfect information scenario yields an appealing threshold based bombing policy. Indeed, the marginal future reward is the threshold at which the control policy switches and furthermore, the threshold is monotonic decreasing with the number of weapons left with the bomber and monotonic nondecreasing with the number of targets left in the mission. For the partial information scenario, we show via a counterexample that the marginal future reward is not the threshold at which the control switches. In light of the negative result, we provide an appealing threshold based heuristic instead. Finally, we address the partial information game, where the target can choose to fire back and establish the Nash equilibrium strategies for a representative two target scenario.

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Section: Prior Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A sequential partial information bomber‐defender shooting problem

Kalyanam

Casbeer

Pachter

2020

Naval Research Logistics

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“…Gao [12] designed a game theoretic model to configure software products and decision errors. Gao-hui [13] worked about depending corporate software developments to game theory.…”

Section: Theory Of Games In Software Engineering Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Examining Reward Mechanisms for Effective Usage of Application Lifecycle Management Tools

Usfekes

Yılmaz

Tüzün

et al. 2017

Communications in Computer and Information Science

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Abstract. Application lifecycle management (ALM) highlights the rules of the road for the entire software ecosystems' lifecycle. Successful ALM enables clarity around the entire delivery effort, from defining requirements to deploying the software product. One of the challenges in software engineering today is to orchestrate ALM tools to a set of software projects effectively. In particular, it is challenging for software practitioners to continuously fully engage with the tasks that are assigned to them. The goal of this study is to address such situations using a game theoretic approach by utilizing a reward mechanism, which we intent to test in a medium-sized software development organization. Based on a set of game elements, this study proposes an auction mechanism to address human resource allocation and task optimization issues, and consequently tackle the potential problem of software practitioners' engagement.

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“…In this paper [10] Network puzzles are an elegant mechanism for mitigating the effects of undesirable network communication. This paper has described the design and implementation of a network layer puzzle protocol and algorithm that can be used to effectively slow down flooding attacks and port scanning activity [11]. The system allows for high-speed implementations in the fast path of modern network devices, can be elastic deployed, and is resistant against replay and spoofing attacks.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Game Theory for Network Security using IPDRS Engine

P¹,

Nadu²

2015

International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer and Comm

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Abstract:With the tremendous growth of network technology, network attackers are also rationally increased to disrupt the activities and hacking the data from the network users by the intruder. To provide the security from the intruder is most important one. Many researchers were proposed a different approach for providing security they does not tackle the problem, it leads an untruthful in the network. In existing system they propose a game based intrusion request and response process by game play of header node to access the data by their correct play, from this if the real header play it in wrong method means all the client user under the header also suffer from the access of the data. To tackle this issue we enhanced the game theory based on the individual play in the network to avoid the suffering of misplayed game played by the header using the IPDRS Engine.

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A game-theory approach to configuration of detection software with decision errors

Cited by 18 publications

References 25 publications

A sequential partial information bomber‐defender shooting problem

A sequential partial information bomber‐defender shooting problem

Examining Reward Mechanisms for Effective Usage of Application Lifecycle Management Tools

Optimal Game Theory for Network Security using IPDRS Engine

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