A genetic game of trade, growth and externalities

Abstract

Cataloged from PDF version of article.A genetic algorithm is introduced to search for optimal policies in the presence of\ud knowledge spillovers and local pollution in a dynamic North/South trade game. Noncooperative\ud trade compounds inefficiencies stemming from externalities. Cooperative\ud trade policies are efficient and yet not credible. Short of a joint maximization of the global\ud welfare, transfer of knowledge remains as a viable route to improve world welfare.\ud 0 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved

Uncertain climate thresholds and optimal economic growth

“…34,35). The numerical problems introduced by the local optima are typically addressed by the choice of a global optimization method such as simulated annealing or a genetic algorithm [2,59].…”

Dynamic Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution

“…Alemdar and Özyildirim [3,4] contribute to this literature. Both papers assume a global economy comprised of two regions, North and South.…”

“…The paper identifies some main factors which could increase the efficiency of voluntary agreements. 3 …”

“…For example, in the regulation of polluting behavior, time is a key element because the interactions between regulator and firms take place over time, because externalities are intertemporal, and because the credibility and efficiency of regulating policies can only be examined over time. 3. Strategic and forward-looking behavior on the part of the agents (business firms, communities, regions, nations) who take actions that affect the environment.…”

Optimal time aggregation of infinite horizon control problems

“…Player one is a GA, GA O , which evolves fw The details of the parallel GAs can be found in Alemdar and Ö zyıldırım (1998). This parallelism is later extended to an online approximation of Stackelberg equilibria in Alemdar and Sirakaya (2003) and feedback Nash equilibria in Sirakaya and Alemdar (2003).…”