2017
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-59879-6_11
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A Hybrid Lattice Basis Reduction and Quantum Search Attack on LWE

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Cited by 34 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…The BRLWE-based encryption scheme is based on the average-case hardness of the BRLWE problem [22]. The work of [32] showed that this scheme achieves 73-bits and 140-bits quantum security for the parameters of (n, q) = (256, 256) and (n, q) = (512, 256), respectively, which fits well typical lightweight applications.…”
Section: B Inverted Binary Ring-lwe (Invbrlwe)mentioning
confidence: 77%
“…The BRLWE-based encryption scheme is based on the average-case hardness of the BRLWE problem [22]. The work of [32] showed that this scheme achieves 73-bits and 140-bits quantum security for the parameters of (n, q) = (256, 256) and (n, q) = (512, 256), respectively, which fits well typical lightweight applications.…”
Section: B Inverted Binary Ring-lwe (Invbrlwe)mentioning
confidence: 77%
“…chosen the same parameter settings according to the existing designs of [23], [24], [29]- [31], i.e., (n, q) = (256, 256) and (n, q) = (512, 256) ( q = 8), which correspond to the quantum/classic security of 73/84-bits and 140/190-bits, respectively [20]; (iv) for a fair and practical comparison, we set the input/output of the proposed accelerator as serialin/serial-out format; (v) the proposed accelerator also includes the third and fourth polynomials Z and W for operations of both encryption and decryption phases as well as related resources; (vi) for a more general demonstration, we do not use the other available resources on the FPGA devices such as the block RAM (BRAM), etc. ; (vii) we have chosen u = 1, u = 2, u = 4, u = 8, and u = 16 for the proposed KINA, respectively, to showcase the high-speed operational performance under different processing setups; (viii) the obtained area-time complexities, in terms of the number of Lookup table (LUT), maximum frequency (Fmax, MHz), latency cycles, delay (critical-path×latency cycles), area-delay product (ADP), and throughput are all listed in Table II along with those of [23], [24], [29]- [31].…”
Section: B Fpga Implementation Results and Comparisonmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Important parameters for the RBLWE-based PQC scheme are: (i) n refers to the scheme-size (security level); (ii) the bit-length of the coefficients in the integer polynomials is log 2 q (which is also the bit-width of the adder); (iii) n 2 = uv, where u and v are integers. The recent works have suggested to use parameter sets of (n, q) = (256, 256) and (n, q) = (512, 256) for RBLWE-based scheme, which also achieves quantum security of 73-bits and 140-bits, respectively [20], [39]. In this case, we have log 2 q = log 2 256 = 8.…”
Section: Kina: Proposed Rblwe-based Pqc Acceleratormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, he gave a method to construct lattice bases for trinary NTRU and various cases to be used in the hybrid attack. A quantum version of the hybrid attack was proposed in [11], where the MitM part is sped up by using a generalization of Grover's quantum search algorithm. However, the hybrid attack seems not considered or just roughly referred among most candidates of the NIST Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization project.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%