Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Wireless Security 2004
DOI: 10.1145/1023646.1023662
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A man-in-the-middle attack on UMTS

Abstract: In this paper we present a man-in-the-middle attack on the Universal Mobile Telecommunication Standard (UMTS), one of the newly emerging 3G mobile technologies. The attack allows an intruder to impersonate a valid GSM base station to a UMTS subscriber regardless of the fact that UMTS authentication and key agreement are used. As a result, an intruder can eavesdrop on all mobile-station-initiated traffic.Since the UMTS standard requires mutual authentication between the mobile station and the network, so far UM… Show more

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Cited by 167 publications
(103 citation statements)
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“…Avoiding the weaknesses in the UMTS security mechanism such as man-in-the-middle attacks, rogue base station attacks, and deny of service (DoS) attacks, The LTE security architecture makes better and more attractive the previous generations [11][12][13]. The expectations from the next generation mobile communication systems are to provide more security functionality than the UMTS systems in order To achieve a mutual authentication between the user equipment (UE) and the mobility management entity (MME) through the evolved-universal terrestrial radio access network (E-UTRAN).…”
Section: G-lte Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Avoiding the weaknesses in the UMTS security mechanism such as man-in-the-middle attacks, rogue base station attacks, and deny of service (DoS) attacks, The LTE security architecture makes better and more attractive the previous generations [11][12][13]. The expectations from the next generation mobile communication systems are to provide more security functionality than the UMTS systems in order To achieve a mutual authentication between the user equipment (UE) and the mobility management entity (MME) through the evolved-universal terrestrial radio access network (E-UTRAN).…”
Section: G-lte Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Most of the reported attacks of this kind take advantage of well-known weaknesses of the GSM authentication and key agreement protocol, such as the lack of mutual authentication and the use of weak encryption. These attacks allow an active attacker to violate the user identity confidentiality, to eavesdrop on outbound communications [56] and to masquerade as a legitimate subscriber obtaining services which will be billed on the victim's account [44]. However, these attacks cannot be carried out on pure 3G networks, because they rely on the lack of mutual authentication in GSM and on the possibility of downgrading the communication from 3G to GSM.…”
Section: G Vulnerabilitiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, whenever the UE visits a new MME and the new MME cannot acquire the IM SI of the UE from the old MME. Such a recovery mechanism provides an opening for a fake MME to compromise a subscribers IM SI [9]. -The SN, whose trustworthiness we question, has full knowledge about the IM SIs of all subscribers to whom it provides services.…”
Section: Identity Privacy Related Vulnerabilities In Eps-akamentioning
confidence: 99%