A Measurement Theoretic Account of Propositions

Abstract

In the first section of this paper I review Measurement Theoretic Semantics -an approach to formal semantics modeled after the application of numbers in measurement, e.g., of length. In the second section it is argued that the measurement theoretic approach to semantics yields a novel, useful conception of propositions. In the third section the measurement theoretic view of propositions is compared with major other accounts of propositional content.

Language and the Measure of Mind

“…In particular, the two questions that were raised towards the end of the previous section with respect to Matthews' position are given satisfactory answers by the suggested unified theory. Thus in the first part of this section I present a measurement theoretic account of meaning that I have argued for in more detail elsewhere, for reasons and motivations that are independent of the discussion of the PAs (Dresner, 1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2006). Then, in the second part of the section, I argue that this account of linguistic meaning can be fruitfully combined with the main ideas in Matthews' account and give rise to a unified account of linguistic meaning and the propositional attitudes.…”

“…The represented domain consists in a class of utterances. (See Dresner, 2002a, 2006 for a discussion of various questions that arise with respect to this characterization. Some of these questions have analogues in numeric measurement—for example, whether the domain consists only of actual utterances, or also of hypothetical ones.…”

“…in Dresner, 2002b, measurement theoretic semantics consists in a formal semantics program—a conceptual framework for the application of mathematical tools in the study of the semantic aspects of language. However, as argued in Dresner, 2006, measurement theoretic semantics also gives expression and support to a philosophical view of linguistic meaning, which may be called a measurement theoretic view. According to this view propositions (which are what sentences mean) are scaled measures, on a par with such notions as 3 meters.…”

“…As opposed to the measurement of length, though, a single‐hook up between the non‐formal and the formal is not sufficient in this case to give rise to a whole mapping between the domains. Rather, as argued in Dresner, 2006, in order to ‘scale’ the formal structure it is required that a set of generators of the structure be associated with utterances (each generator with an utterance, that is). In this way the mapping can be extrapolated to the whole structure, in the same way that it is extrapolated in the simpler (but essentially similar) case of length measurement.…”

“…Also, this view of propositions can be shown to accommodate talk about possible worlds without a full‐fledged commitment to their existence. For elaboration see Dresner, 2006.…”