A model of candidate location with endogenous valence

Abstract

Electoral competition, Valence, Polarization,

Technological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization

“…The structure of our model, where parties first choose platforms and then spending, resembles existing models of endogenous valence (e.g., Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009);Zakharov (2009);Carrillo and Castanheira (2008); Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2013) among others). In that literature, voters typically have additive separable preferences over platforms and valence (i.e., electoral advertising).…”

A stochastic model of the 2007 Russian Duma election

“…Schofield (2006a) has suggested that Madison's argument may well have been influenced by Condorcet's work on the so-called "Jury Theorem" (Condorcet 1785). Condorcet's work has recently received renewed attention (Ladha 1992(Ladha , 1993McLennan 1998) and formal models have been presented based on the notion of valence, the perception of the quality of the political leader (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000;Groseclose 2001;Palfrey 2002, 2005;Zakharov 2009). The work in this research program can be seen as a contribution to the development of a Madisonian conception of elections in representative democracies as methods of aggregation of both preferences and judgments (Madison 1787).…”

May increased partisanship lead to convergence of parties’ policy platforms?

“…Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009) show in a model where candidates can invest in their reputations ('charisma'), that a higher valence advantage of a candidate over his/her opponent has a smaller impact on the fraction of voters the candidate attracts, the more distant platforms are from each other. Zakharov (2009) explains in a similar framework why party polarization and campaign spending have simultaneously risen in the United States. In both papers, 5 Alesina and Cukierman (1990) study a different kind of policy ambiguity.…”

“…They show that divergence may occur when campaign costs are sufficiently high in order to mitigate political competition. Another interesting source of divergence of parties' platforms is non-policy related valence competition (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2009;Zakharov 2009). Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009) show in a model where candidates can invest in their reputations ('charisma'), that a higher valence advantage of a candidate over his/her opponent has a smaller impact on the fraction of voters the candidate attracts, the more distant platforms are from each other.…”