A Model of Public Choice with Clientelism and Corruption: Introducing the Analytical

Cendales, Andrés; Garza, Néstor; Arroyo, Santiago

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-13009-1_3

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…We first present the game of electoral competition with clientelism and then introduce the period of government as a model of public expenditure with corruption. Our model is similar to the regionalized and syntactic presentation of Cendales et al (2019), although ours has a national scope and it is explicitly solved. In addition, we are empirically testing the model using DiD regression.…”

Section: A Simple Model Of Subnational Public Choice With Clientelism...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The median voter is a low-income citizen living in a “Crisis of Democratic Representation”, with a low marginal valuation of their vote, and who easily sell it to local political brokers (Nieva, 2019; Robinson, 2016; Eaton and Chambers, 2014; Eaton, 2006; Eduardo and Muñloz, 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Our theoretical model is in this sense similar to the regionalized presentation of Cendales et al (2019), although ours has a national scope and it is explicitly solved. In addition, we are performing the corresponding empirical test.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Political machines and the curse of public resources in subnational democracies

Cendales

Garza

Arcila

2021

JES

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PurposeThis paper argues that decentralization reforms in Colombia, implemented since the 1980s, have led to the decentralization of political clientelism rather than its demise. Clientelism is a system of political and economic institutions that turns every local democracy into an extractive political institution. The authors theoretically demonstrate that an increase in public resources will increase corruption.Design/methodology/approachThe authors develop and test a subnational public choice model, where clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration constitute a stable long-term institutional equilibrium. The model comprises two linked subgames: electoral tournament and corruption in public policy. The model makes two predictions that currently oppose predominant approaches: (1) increasing the severity of jail sentences to electoral crimes increases their price and the predominance of machine politics, instead of improving the quality of electoral tournaments and (2) increasing local governments' public finance increases clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration.FindingsThe authors find evidence in favor of the theoretical model of curse of public resources, using difference-in-differences estimation with a database 2016–17 of Colombia's 1,034 municipalities. This country is well-suited for our analysis because it has a long-term commitment to formal democratic processes (since 1958), while plagued by endemic corruption and clientelism problems.Originality/value(1) The theoretical approach is innovative and disruptive of current models on the problem, (2) the model builds upon the Colombian situation, a country with prominent corruption and political violence problems regardless of its relatively long-term commitment with free elections (since 1958) and (3) the theoretical discussion is tested using a comprehensive set of difference-in-differences estimations.

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Section: A Simple Model Of Subnational Public Choice With Clientelism...mentioning

confidence: 99%