2021
DOI: 10.1109/tcad.2020.3036807
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A Modeling Attack Resistant Deception Technique for Securing Lightweight-PUF-Based Authentication

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Cited by 45 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…To address this limitation, Gu et al [12] proposed a device-to-device PUF based protocol which uses deception techniques, e.g., a fake PUF circuit and random numbers, to prevent the adversary from predicting the PUF responses.…”
Section: Access Decision Figure 8 Location-based Authenticationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To address this limitation, Gu et al [12] proposed a device-to-device PUF based protocol which uses deception techniques, e.g., a fake PUF circuit and random numbers, to prevent the adversary from predicting the PUF responses.…”
Section: Access Decision Figure 8 Location-based Authenticationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The proposed TH-PUF mitigates the attack of LR and CMA-ES attacks compared with traditional PUF designs, because the adversary needs more time and resources to collect enough CRPs to achieve higher prediction rates for the proposed PUF. To completely thwart machine learning attacks, there are many other protocol-based approaches, such as deception protocol [36], that can be applied to the proposed TH-PUF. The prediction rates of different stages of the proposed TH-PUF to LR and CMA-ES are reported in TABLE IV; an increased complexity of the proposed TH-PUF is beneficial to security, as the 64-bit TH-PUF shows robustness to the attacks.…”
Section: Security Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Poisoning the PUF's response to mislead the adversary is another approach to prevent ML attacks. One such method is proposed in [116], where a duplicated or a fake PUF, is embedded in the chip alongside the original PUF to delay the adversary from collecting sufficient correct CRPs for training. It provides fake CRPs for consecutive authentication requests made within a waiting time to mislead the adversary in building an incorrect PUF model.…”
Section: B Modeling Attacks On Pufs and Robustness Enhancementsmentioning
confidence: 99%