A Modular and Optimized Toolbox for Side-Channel Analysis

Rodríguez, Alberto Fuentes; Encinas, Luis Hernández; Muñoz, Agustín Martín; Alarcos, Bernardo

doi:10.1109/access.2019.2897938

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 35 publications

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“…Timing attacks [1] were first proposed in the field of cryptographic devices in 1996. Since then, non-intrusive SCAs technology has set off a wave of research in the field of information security [4]- [8]. Power analysis attacks [2] use the energy consumption characteristics of cryptographic devices rather than the mathematical characteristics of cryptographic algorithms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Energy Trace Compression Method for Differential Power Analysis Attack

Cai

Kuang

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

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Differential power analysis attacks are the most commonly used means to break cryptographic devices within the side-channel attack technology. Since there is a lot of noise in the energy trace of cryptographic devices, a large number of energy traces are needed to carry out the attack, resulting in a high computational cost. To solve this problem, this study starts with an analysis of the characteristics of power waveform formation from the inherent properties of the complementary metal oxide semiconductor circuit. Then, based on the Hamming distance classification method and the results of power waveform analysis, the useful information interval in the energy trace is located, that is, the interval with a strong correlation with the key. Thus, we achieve energy trace compression. Finally, a system on chip with a 128-bit AES algorithm is used to conduct various attack experiments in the effective interval. The results show that the calculation is cut off by 96%, which greatly reduces the computational cost for differential power analysis attacks.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Energy Trace Compression Method for Differential Power Analysis Attack

Cai

Kuang

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

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Classifying Proprietary Firmware on a Solid State Drive Using Idle State Current Draw Measurements

et al. 2020

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Solid state drives (SSDs) are coming under increased scrutiny as their popularity continues to grow. SSDs differ from their hard disk drive predecessors because they include an onboard layer of firmware to perform required maintenance tasks related to data location mapping, write performance, and drive lifetime management. This firmware layer is transparent to the user and can be difficult to characterize despite its clear potential to impact drive behavior. Flaws and vulnerabilities in this firmware layer have become increasingly common. In this work, we propose and analyze a technique to classify different versions of proprietary firmware on an SSD through the use of current draw measurements. We demonstrate that major groupings of firmware can be classified using current draw measurements not only from explicitly active drive states such as read and write but also from the low power idle state. We achieve pairwise classifications rates near 100% between firmware examples in these different major groupings. Coupling these results with firmware release information, we are able to infer major updates in the firmware timeline for the SSD we examined. We also develop an anomaly detector and achieve detection rates of 100% for samples that reside outside of the reference grouping.

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HTB: A Very Effective Method to Protect Web Servers Against BREACH Attack to HTTPS

et al. 2022

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BREACH is a side-channel attack to HTTPS that allows an attacker to obtain victims' credentials under certain conditions. An attacker with a privileged position on the network can guess character by character a secret session key just by analyzing the size of the responses returned by the server over HTTPS and encrypted. Heal the Breach (HTB) is the proposed technique to mitigate BREACH attack by randomly changing the size of server responses through a modified gzip library. The attacker needs a precision of one byte in the size of the responses to be able to determine if a guess character is part of the secret token. Since the modified gzip library introduces randomness in the size of the response, BREACH becomes ineffective. The only way to circumvent this protection is to make several requests and compute the average size of the response, which minimizes the random effect. Mathematical and experimental results show that, for a random variation of the size from 1 to 10 bytes, an attacker needs to analyze 500 times more packages to obtain enough accuracy and surpass this mitigation. However, if the number of requests increases it is easier to isolate and block the attack using standard Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Compared to other mitigations, the approach presented in this paper is very effective, easy to implement for all websites hosted in the server, and produces a negligible increase in normal traffic.

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A Modular and Optimized Toolbox for Side-Channel Analysis

Cited by 4 publications

References 35 publications

An Energy Trace Compression Method for Differential Power Analysis Attack

An Energy Trace Compression Method for Differential Power Analysis Attack

Classifying Proprietary Firmware on a Solid State Drive Using Idle State Current Draw Measurements

HTB: A Very Effective Method to Protect Web Servers Against BREACH Attack to HTTPS

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