A Modular Testing Environment for Implementation Attacks

Judge, Lyndon; Cantrell, Michael; Kendir, Cagil; Schaumont, Patrick

doi:10.1109/biomedcom.2012.21

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…A modular testing environment to verify the resistance of a system against side-channel attacks was proposed in [47]. IA-Meter is an open-source solution allowing the testing to be independent of the system platform, implementation details, and type of attack under evaluation.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Modular and Optimized Toolbox for Side-Channel Analysis

et al. 2019

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The aim of this paper is to describe the characteristics of a toolbox developed to carry out a side-channel analysis of cryptosystems implemented in physical devices. The toolbox, called RamDPA and developed in C++, is flexible and modular and has been initially designed to carry out differential power analysis attacks. Different modules are used to enter text, keys, and hypothetical values related to the cryptographic algorithm under analysis, to control the digital oscilloscope in charge of the acquisition of power consumption traces, and to carry out the statistical operations to get the unknown key. An analysis of the different options to program the modules has been performed in order to optimize the toolbox in terms of memory consumption and execution time. Usually, the optimization of side-channel attacks comes from the selection of points-of-interest and re-sampling. Instead of that approach, the proposed toolbox optimizes DPA attacks from caching strategy and multithreading. Results are presented by applying RamDPA to extract an AES-128 key with the traces provided by the CHES2016 capture The Flag challenge. INDEX TERMS Cryptography, information security, open source software, side-channel attacks, software tools.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Modular and Optimized Toolbox for Side-Channel Analysis

et al. 2019

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“…These do not target the underlying mathematical principles, but the implementation of the cipher. Consequently, they are also called implementation attacks [96]. In addition to the mathematical cryptanalyses, these implementation attacks nowadays also form part of cryptanalysis and can, in turn, be divided into two groups (see Figure 1.1, which is based on [131]).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity

Krämer

2015

T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services

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Ich versichere an Eides statt, dass ich diese Dissertation selbständig verfasst und nur die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe. Datum Für meine Eltern AbstractEver since the first side channel attacks and fault attacks on cryptographic devices were introduced in the mid-nineties, new possibilities of physical attacks have been consistently explored. The risk that these attacks pose is reduced by reacting to known attacks and by developing and implementing countermeasures against them. For physical attacks whose theory is known but which have not been conducted yet, however, the situation is different. Attacks whose physical realization is assumed to be very complex are taken less seriously. The trust that these attacks will not be realized due to their physical complexity means that no countermeasures are developed at all. This leads to unprotected devices once the assessment of the complexity turns out to be wrong.This thesis presents two practical physical attacks whose theory is known for several years. Since neither attack has previously been successfully implemented in practice, however, they were not considered a serious threat. Their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, we introduce the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its first realization, it has not been taken seriously. We show both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, we present a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has also not been taken seriously. We show how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these physical attacks. We present countermeasures on the software and the hardware level, which help to prevent these attacks in the future.Based on these two presented attacks, this thesis shows that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone. Hence, cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, have they already been realized or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is understood.

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Side Channel Assessment Platforms and Tools for Ubiquitous Systems

Fournaris

Moschos

Sklavos

2021

Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems

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Side Channel Attacks are nowadays considered a serious risk for many security products and ubiquitous devices. Strong security solution providers need to evaluate their implementations against such attacks before publishing them on the market, thus performing a thorough assessment. However, this procedure is not straightforward and even with the appropriate equipment, it may require considerable time to provide results due to the slow process of collecting measurements (traces) and the inflexible way of controlling the tested implementation. In this chapter, we explore and overview the trace collection landscape for generic devices under test (including ubiquitous systems) highlighting and overviewing the latest trace collection toolsets and their shortcomings, but also proposing a trace collection approach that can be applied on the most recent, open source toolsets. We showcase our proposed approach on the FlexLeco project architecture, which we have developed in our lab, and manage to practically describe how an evaluator using the proposed methodology can collect traces easily and quickly without the need to completely redesign a control mechanism for the implementation under test.

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A Modular Testing Environment for Implementation Attacks

Cited by 4 publications

References 7 publications

A Modular and Optimized Toolbox for Side-Channel Analysis

A Modular and Optimized Toolbox for Side-Channel Analysis

Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity

Side Channel Assessment Platforms and Tools for Ubiquitous Systems

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