A Moorean argument for the full moral status of those with profound intellectual disability:

Abstract

IntroductionThis paper is about the moral status of those human beings with profound intellectual disabilities (PIDs). We hold the common sense view that they have equal status to 'normal' human beings, and a higher status than any non-human animal. 1 We start with an admission, however: we don't know how to give a fully satisfying theoretical account of the grounds of moral status that explains this view. 2 And in fact, not only do we not know how to give such an account, but the most satisfying account of moral status that we know (which we call 'the standard account') entails that our view is false. It entails that those with PIDs have a lower status than ordinary human beings and an equal status to non-human animals. Now, in this paper, we do absolutely nothing to try to show where the standard account goes wrong, and we do absolutely nothing to resolve the difficulties we see in developing an alternative account that supports our view. Indeed, we do not give any argument against the standard account or in favour of our own view. Instead, we raise the following question: in order to be justified in continuing to hold our view, are we obliged to give such an account? Our answer will be that we are not.In section 1 we emphasise just how common our view is, and how deeply held it is, before outlining the difficulties surrounding giving a theoretical account that justifies it. After introducing the Moorean strategy in section 2, in section 3 we argue that despite these 1 We are fully aware of the culturally specific and normative nature of the notion of normality; normality denotes both a judgment of reality, hence, what is statistically frequent, and a judgment of value, meaning, what is valued. Our usage of the term refers exclusively to the former, descriptive sense of it (see chapter 2 in [1]). 2 Elsewhere we have given a defence of what we think to be the most plausible theoretical account that does explain the view, but we admit that the view has shortcomings, and more work needs to be done before it can be said to be fully satisfying. See [WITHELD FOR ANONYMITY] 2 difficulties, and despite the fact that we do not know how to overcome them, it is not the case that we ought to abandon our view. The Moorean strategy we employ is drawn from a common interpretation of G. E. Moore's famous proof of the external world (due to William Lycan). Our argument is that the strategy that Lycan's Moore applies in that case can be successfully applied in the case of our view too. 1.The belief that all human beings have a higher moral status than any non-human animal is a deeply held belief, common in all classes and cultures from around the world today. According to this belief it is impermissible to treat humans in ways that it is permissible to treat nonhuman animals. Quite how deeply held this ordinary belief is can be brought home by considering the reaction most would have to finding human steaks alongside the other meats at the supermarket counter. No empirical study is needed to know that almost everyone wou...

Having hands and moral status: a reply to Curtis and Vehmas

“…Benjamin Curtis and Simo Vehmas repurpose the form of GE Moore's ‘Proof of an External World’ to argue that even without an account of why they have it, one can be justified in continuing to believe that all and only humans have full moral status 1. The position the authors intend to defend is that the justifiability of continuing to believe that no non-humans have full moral status while all humans with profound intellectual disabilities (PIDs) do is independent of our ability to plausibly explain how those facts could be so.…”

What moral status should be accorded to those human beings who have profound intellectual disabilities? A reply to Curtis and Vehmas

“…They write: ‘[W]hat does the moral status of human beings consist in?… According to the standard account of moral status a being's moral status can derive only from its possession of intrinsic properties … But what intrinsic properties are possessed by all human beings and no non-human animal?’1 They consider the answer:There are some morally relevant intrinsic properties that are possessed by all normal adult human beings. These are the Lockean psychological properties, the possession of which is often thought to constitute a being’'s personhood.…”

“…In the absence of any apparent alternative to the standard account, there is, they argue, a philosophical conundrum for anyone who accepts the common-sense moral view. Moreover, they argue that ‘ According to the standard account of moral status, psychologically similar human and non-human animals have equal moral status … [This entails] that if it is permissible to eat non-human animals, then it is permissible to eat human beings who are psychologically similar in relevant respects….’ 1. This, they suggest, is profoundly shocking.…”

“…According to Curtis and Vehmas,1 what they call ‘the standard account’ of the philosophical exposition of the nature of personhood and moral status clashes with what they consider to be the common-sense moral view, a view they accept, about the equal moral status of those human beings who have and those who do not have profound intellectual disabilities. In the absence of any apparent alternative to the standard account, there is, they argue, a philosophical conundrum for anyone who accepts the common-sense moral view.…”

The Moorean argument for the full moral status of those with profound intellectual disability: a rejoinder to Roberts

“…In a recent paper we argued that a Moorean strategy can be employed to justify our continuing to believe the following proposition, even in the presence of philosophical views that entail that it is false, without any philosophical argument against those views, and without any positive philosophical argument in its favour: H>A: Humans have an equal moral status that is higher than the moral status of non-human animals 1…”