Although there was a rise in P-III-P after injury, this was insufficient to invalidate the GH-2000 detection method based on IGF-I and P-III-P concentrations.

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IntroductionThis paper is about the moral status of those human beings with profound intellectual disabilities (PIDs). We hold the common sense view that they have equal status to 'normal' human beings, and a higher status than any non-human animal. 1 We start with an admission, however: we don't know how to give a fully satisfying theoretical account of the grounds of moral status that explains this view. 2 And in fact, not only do we not know how to give such an account, but the most satisfying account of moral status that we know (which we call 'the standard account') entails that our view is false. It entails that those with PIDs have a lower status than ordinary human beings and an equal status to non-human animals. Now, in this paper, we do absolutely nothing to try to show where the standard account goes wrong, and we do absolutely nothing to resolve the difficulties we see in developing an alternative account that supports our view. Indeed, we do not give any argument against the standard account or in favour of our own view. Instead, we raise the following question: in order to be justified in continuing to hold our view, are we obliged to give such an account? Our answer will be that we are not.In section 1 we emphasise just how common our view is, and how deeply held it is, before outlining the difficulties surrounding giving a theoretical account that justifies it. After introducing the Moorean strategy in section 2, in section 3 we argue that despite these 1 We are fully aware of the culturally specific and normative nature of the notion of normality; normality denotes both a judgment of reality, hence, what is statistically frequent, and a judgment of value, meaning, what is valued. Our usage of the term refers exclusively to the former, descriptive sense of it (see chapter 2 in [1]). 2 Elsewhere we have given a defence of what we think to be the most plausible theoretical account that does explain the view, but we admit that the view has shortcomings, and more work needs to be done before it can be said to be fully satisfying. See [WITHELD FOR ANONYMITY] 2 difficulties, and despite the fact that we do not know how to overcome them, it is not the case that we ought to abandon our view. The Moorean strategy we employ is drawn from a common interpretation of G. E. Moore's famous proof of the external world (due to William Lycan). Our argument is that the strategy that Lycan's Moore applies in that case can be successfully applied in the case of our view too. 1.The belief that all human beings have a higher moral status than any non-human animal is a deeply held belief, common in all classes and cultures from around the world today. According to this belief it is impermissible to treat humans in ways that it is permissible to treat nonhuman animals. Quite how deeply held this ordinary belief is can be brought home by considering the reaction most would have to finding human steaks alongside the other meats at the supermarket counter. No empirical study is needed to know that almost everyone wou...

Antiques are undoubtedly objects worthy of aesthetic appreciation, but do they have a distinctive aesthetic value in virtue of being antiques? In this article we give an account of what it is to be an antique that gives the thesis that they do have a distinctive aesthetic value a chance of being true and suggests what that distinctive value consists in. After introducing our topic in Section I, in Section II we develop and defend the Adjectival Thesis: the thesis that the concept of being an antique is an adjectival concept. This provides us with the means to formulate our definition, which we do in Section III. In Section IV we further explicate and defend our definition. In Section V we conclude by briefly saying where we think our definition could be improved, by making a few comments about the aesthetics of antiques and by stating an interesting consequence of our definition: that it is not analytic that antiques are old.

This article engages with debates concerning the moral worth of human beings with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities (PIMDs). Some argue that those with such disabilities are morally less valuable than so-called normal human beings, whereas others argue that all human beings have equal moral value and that, therefore, each group of humans ought to be treated with equal concern. We will argue in favor of a view that takes points from opposing camps in the debates about the moral worth of humans with such disabilities. Our position, roughly, is this: most humans with PIMDs are persons in the morally significant sense and, therefore, deserve moral consideration equal to that granted to so-called "normal" human beings. Some humans with PIMD may not be persons, but nevertheless deserve moral consideration equal to that of persons because they stand in a special relation to persons.