A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest

Clark, Derek J.; Riis, Christian

doi:10.1007/bf00151735

“…Therefore, there are now ℎ winners who each get a prize of /ℎ. Following Clark and Riis (1996), I assume that the ℎ winners are chosen as follows: the first winner is determined by using the probability distribution which arises after the rent-seeking outlays of all players are collected. The first winner is then eliminated and the second winner is determined by using the probability distribution which arises when the outlay of the first winner is excluded.…”

Section: Multiple Prizes In the Quality Contestmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This process continues until all ℎ winners are determined. Then, as Clark and Riis (1996) showed, the probability that player will win one of the ≥ 2 prizes is:…”

Section: Multiple Prizes In the Quality Contestmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Quantity-Cum-Quality Contests

Amegashie

¹

2018

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Quantity-cum-Quality Contests Abstract I consider a contest in which the quantity of output is rewarded and another in which the quality of output is rewarded. The output in the quality contest plays a dual role. It counts in the quality contest but it is also converted into quantity-equivalent output to obtain total output in the quantity contest. This latter feature implies that the two contests are interlinked. Examples abound. There are contests in which there is a prize for the number (quantity) of publications by a scholar, a politician's accomplishments, an athlete's number of Olympic medals, etc and there is also a prize for a scholar's publications in top journals, a politician's major accomplishments, or an athlete's number of Olympic gold medals . I find that when the unit cost of producing quality is sufficiently high, then treating quality and quantity as the same has a disincentive effect on the production of quality. In contrast, when the unit cost of producing quality is sufficiently low, treating quality and quantity as the same has no disincentive effect on the production of quality. There is an equilibrium in which high-ability and low-ability contestants, in spite of being non-identical, have the same probability of winning the quantity contest. When contestants are budget-constrained, I find that whether an increase in the budget will increase effort in the quality contest depends on the size of the initial budget. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Codes: D720.

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“…If all agents exert zero effort, each of them wins with equal probability. With more than one prize, as in our optimal contests, the contest success function can be applied in a nested fashion (see Clark and Riis, 1996): the first prize is allocated according to (1) among all n agents, the second prize is allocated according to (1) restricted to those n − 1 agents who have not received the first prize, and so on. Tullock contests are a special case for f (e i ) = e r i , where r ≥ 0 is a parameter measuring the randomness of the allocation rule.…”

Section: Implementation In Tullock Contestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Delegating Performance Evaluation

Letina

¹

,

Liu

²

,

Netzer

³

2017

SSRN Journal

3

0

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance evaluation is delegated to a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of the bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal determines a set of prizes to be allocated to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer's potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be uniquely implemented by an all-pay auction with a cap, and it can also be implemented by a nested Tullock contest. Our analysis has implications for applications as diverse as the design of worker compensation, the awarding of research grants, and the allocation of foreign aid.

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“…In the first of these, Fu and Lu (2012) examine the optimal structure of multistage sequential elimination contests using a multi-winner extension of the Tullock (1980) contest success function due to Clark and Riis (1996). 3 The contest designer is allowed to control the contest sequencing, the number of players eliminated at each stage, and the allocation of a fixed sum of prize money in order to maximize expected total effort.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction

Konrad

¹

,

Kovenock

²

2012

Econ Theory

0

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. The workshop brought together 25 scholars from around the world to present and discuss 14 papers over a period of two days. We are grateful to CESifo and to its president and chief executive officer, Hans Werner Sinn, for funding the workshop and for the organizational support provided by Karin Fournier and Deirdre Hall.The conference program included pure and applied theoretical contributions, as well as experimental tests of theory. The ten papers in this symposium are a strict subset of the papers presented, each revised based upon the comments of the conference discussants and the anonymous reviewers in the regular editorial process.The first four of these papers present extensions of several fundamental contest models to address, respectively, risk aversion, incomplete information, richer prize structures, and externalities from bids. The first, by Cornes and Hartley (2012), examines

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A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest

Cited by 101 publications

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Quantity-Cum-Quality Contests

Quantity-Cum-Quality Contests

Delegating Performance Evaluation

Introduction

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