A New Cinderella Story: Joint Ventures and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm

Gattai, Valeria; Natale, Piergiovanna

doi:10.1111/joes.12135

Cited by 18 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 84 publications

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“…These situations include relation-specific investments embodied in physical capital (Hart, 1995;Schmitz, 2013), an infinitely repeated relationship (Halonen, 2002), a different renegotiation process (De Meza and Lockwood, 1998) and the endogenous specificity of investments (Cai, 2003). For the recent literature survey on joint ownership, see Gattai and Natale (2015). 7.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive for innovation and the optimal allocation of patents

Hamada

2017

Australian Journal of Management

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This article theoretically investigates how different ownership structures of patents affect ex ante and ex post incentives for innovation by applying a property rights approach. We explore a model in which two research laboratories invest in R&D to obtain an innovative patent, and after successfully obtaining the patent they determine an ownership structure for the patent. The two parties consider how the determined patent ownership would affect their noncontractible relation-specific investments for commercialisation. We demonstrate that joint ownership of a patent between two parties is optimal. More concretely, if a selfish (altruistic) relation-specific investment is more important than an altruistic (selfish) investment, a joint ownership with no (bilateral) veto is optimal to maximise the joint value. Moreover, when both parties do not commit themselves to joint ownership in advance, they have greater incentive to invest in R&D than committing, even if they understand that joint ownership is desirable ex post.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive for innovation and the optimal allocation of patents

Hamada

2017

Australian Journal of Management

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“…The original GHM theory leaves no room for joint ownership, and it took much development in the literature, and many additional assumptions to derive a more realistic ownership result. Gattai and Natale (2015) provided a good survey of this journey. In the Surplus theory, joint ownership is naturally derived.…”

Section: Figure 1 Surplus Property Right Theory Of the Firmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk, Preference, Capital Structure and Incentives

Wu¹

2018

IBR

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Using the surplus theory of the firm, we examine capital and labor as inputs of a surplus generating firm, and study the capital structure of the firm. We derive two equilibrium models on: (a) the capital structure and ownership of the firm and (b) alternative incentive compensation structures. Within the framework of the firm as a cooperative surplus generating enterprise, we introduce the concepts of risk, preference and resource constraints, to provide a framework for analyzing more sophisticated methods of dividing the risks and rewards of the firm’s surplus.

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“…In this recent setting, equity joint ventures is a hybrid form that has been extensively studied (see for instance, Bai et al ., , Dasgupta and Tao, ). Gattai and Natale () provided a recent survey.…”

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confidence: 99%

Surveying the Economics of Plural Modes of Organization

Raynaud

Schnaider

Saes

2019

Journal of Economic Surveys

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Why do firms concomitantly rely on more than one organizational arrangement to procure/distribute a given input/product? In this paper, we systematically review and discuss the extensive path undergone by the literature exploring this issue: the so‐called plural forms. We address two main questions: how to explain the coexistence (and often the prevalence) of plural forms in many types of businesses? Are plural forms stable or a transitory phenomenon? We describe the most prominent motivations identified in the economics and management literature that drive firms to adopt plural forms and show that their vast majority are related to the mitigation of various types of agency/transaction costs. We also demonstrate that most of the available pieces of empirical evidence suggest the stability of plural forms over time. We conclude by demonstrating the path that has been trailed by the most recent developments.

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A New Cinderella Story: Joint Ventures and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm

Cited by 18 publications

References 84 publications

Incentive for innovation and the optimal allocation of patents

Incentive for innovation and the optimal allocation of patents

Risk, Preference, Capital Structure and Incentives

Surveying the Economics of Plural Modes of Organization

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