IntroductionThe evolution of human intelligence has allowed not just deeper understanding of the world, but a greater capacity to act on it. Such operant actions imply the ability to know that one is performing an action, and to represent its consequences (Dickinson & Balleine, 2000). Research on the epistemic content and conscious experience of action has identified two distinct processes underlying this ability.According to ideomotor theories (e.g. James, 1890), actions are internally represented by reference to their external consequences. On this view, making an operant action involves a prediction of the action goal, an idea supported by recent models of 3 computational motor control (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002;Berti et al, 2006). Alternatively, the conscious experience of operant action may be inferred from sensory evidence (Wegner, 2002). In particular, spatial and temporal correlations between thoughts, physical movement, and external events may lead to us to infer that we have caused an external event.Voluntary actions have strong effects on the subjective passage of time (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Temporal effects provide a common measure allowing the predictive and inferential contributions to experience of action to be compared directly.When a voluntary action, but not an involuntary movement, is followed by an external event, people perceive the action as shifted in time towards its effect, and the effect as shifted earlier in time towards the action that caused it (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). This 'intentional binding' involves a predictive element, because omitting the effect does not prevent the shift in perceived time of action, as long as the probability of an effect given an action is sufficiently high (Moore & Haggard, 2008). It also involves an inferential "postdictive" element, because the tone's occurrence shifts the perceived time of action, even when tone probability is low (Moore & Haggard, 2008).This suggests that the human mind builds internal models of action-effect relations, which determine the experience of action. Here, we investigate whether rules thought to govern causal learning in animals might also underlie the experience of agency in humans. Contingency is an index of the causal relation between events, and predicts patterns of operant learning in animals (Hammond, 1980). Contingency is defined here 4 as the probability of an effect (E) given an action (A), minus the probability of E in the absence of A. This index is known as ∆p (Allan, 1980):Where ∆p > 0 the effect is more probable in the presence than in the absence of action.Conversely, where ∆p < 0 the effect is less probable in the presence than in the absence
ProcedureParticipants chose on each trial whether or not to press a key with their right index finger.The element of choice was included because computing ∆p requires trials with and without actions. They viewed a rotating clock hand (period 2560 ms, see Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983), and used this to judge the time of their ac...