A partial credit guarantee contract in a capital-constrained supply chain: Financing equilibrium and coordinating strategy

Yan, Nina; Sun, Bo; Zhang, Hui; Liu, Chongqing

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.12.005

Cited by 234 publications

(169 citation statements)

References 19 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

165

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…According to Yan et al 34 we have H(x 0 ) < H(q * ) ≤ 1 for IFR demand distributions. Then, the inequality of F x 0 ð Þ 1 þ r ð Þ 1−H x 0 ð Þ ð Þ >0 holds.…”

Section: A3 | Proof Of Corollarymentioning

confidence: 97%

Effects of risk aversion and decision preference on equilibriums in supply chain finance incorporating bank credit with credit guarantee

Yan

Liu

et al. 2017

Appl Stoch Models Bus & Ind

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We constructed a Stackelberg game in a supply chain finance (SCF) system including a manufacturer, a capital‐constrained retailer, and a bank that provides loans on the basis of the manufacturer's credit guarantee. To emphasize the financial service providers' risks, we assumed that both the bank and the manufacturer are risk‐averse and formulated trade‐off objective functions for both of them as the convex combination of the expected profit and conditional value‐at‐risk. To explore the effects of the risk preferences and decision preferences on SCF equilibriums, we mathematically analyzed the optimal order quantities, wholesale prices, and interest rates under different risk preference scenarios and performed numerical analyses to quantify the effects. We found that incorporating bank credit with a credit guarantee can effectively balance the retailer's financing risk between the bank and the manufacturer through interest rate charging and wholesale pricing. Moreover, SCF equilibriums with risk aversion are highly affected by the degree of both the lender's and guarantor's risk tolerance in regard to the borrower's default probability and will be more conservative than those in the risk‐neutral cases that only maximize expected profit.

show abstract

“…According to Yan et al 34 we have H(x 0 ) < H(q * ) ≤ 1 for IFR demand distributions. Then, the inequality of F x 0 ð Þ 1 þ r ð Þ 1−H x 0 ð Þ ð Þ >0 holds.…”

Section: A3 | Proof Of Corollarymentioning

confidence: 97%

Effects of risk aversion and decision preference on equilibriums in supply chain finance incorporating bank credit with credit guarantee

Yan

Liu

et al. 2017

Appl Stoch Models Bus & Ind

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…[1], [26] and [42]). Recently, some literatures investigated the financially weaker partner's bank financing model which incorporates a stronger partner's intermediary and guarantee, and analyzed the impact of risk sharing or warranty mechanism on the bank financing strategy (such as, [9], [21] and [41]).…”

Section: Supply Chain Financementioning

confidence: 99%

A financing model with rebate contract in a capital-constrained supply chain

Zhan

2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In a two-level supply chain that includes one supplier and one capital-constrained retailer, this paper investigates a new bank financing model (Model N), in which, the supplier requires the retailer to order a quantity that is not less than a specified minimum ordering quantity (MOQ), rebates the per unit excess that sells over the MOQ, and promises to provide a partial warranty for the bank credit risk if the revenue is below the bankruptcy level of the retailer with the MOQ. This study shows that retailer's optimal order quantity increases with MOQ level and decreases with rebate rate, while supplier's optimal wholesale price shows an opposite tendency. Compared to the traditional bank financing model (Model T), the model N with an appropriate rebate contract will result in a larger order quantity of retailer. Furthermore, model N would benefit the entire supply chain and a Pareto zone of MOQ (or rebate rate) exists, in which, model N outperforms model T for each player. The numerical experiments are performed to illustrate that with increasing the marginal production cost of supplier, the MOQ level is decreasing while rebate rate is increasing in the Pareto zone.

show abstract

“…According to Gao et al (2014), certain contracts are better than others as they increase the performance of overall SC and manage the SC when there is a risk of bankruptcy. According to Yan et al (2016), contract type and their coordination effect can be categorised in accordance with the type of financing scheme [39]. Under different financing schemes coordinated by different actors, the coordination effect of same type of contract can vary.…”

Section: Coordination Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Systematic Literature Review on Supply Chain Finance Actors, Instruments and Processes

Chakuu¹,

Masi²,

Godsell³

2018

dtetr

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Supply Chain Finance (SCF) aims at managing the financial flows along the supply chain with an objective of maximising the creation and delivery of financial services. The literature on SCF is complex and focuses on SCF actors, SCF instruments and supply chain processes. However, the connection between these elements is weak, and the configurations of actors, instruments and processes that maximises financial value creation is unclear. In the light of this gap, this article aims at reviewing the literature on SCF, with a specific focus on actors, instruments, coordination, performance of processes and their interrelation. A systematic approach has been taken to the literature review, which ensures it is auditable and repeatable. The selection criteria are clearly aligned with the review questions and relevant information is extracted from the selected papers and synthesised into a set of constructs. Furthermore, the constructs are used to develop a conceptual framework to align SCF actors and instruments along with the contextual factors.

show abstract

A partial credit guarantee contract in a capital-constrained supply chain: Financing equilibrium and coordinating strategy

Cited by 234 publications

References 19 publications

Effects of risk aversion and decision preference on equilibriums in supply chain finance incorporating bank credit with credit guarantee

Effects of risk aversion and decision preference on equilibriums in supply chain finance incorporating bank credit with credit guarantee

A financing model with rebate contract in a capital-constrained supply chain

A Systematic Literature Review on Supply Chain Finance Actors, Instruments and Processes

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About