2021
DOI: 10.1007/s10473-021-0521-6
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A Penalty Function Method for the Principal-Agent Problem with an Infinite Number of Incentive-Compatibility Constraints under Moral Hazard

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Cited by 4 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…In addition, a voltage regulator has been considered in this system as another option to control voltage deviation. A derivative-based optimization method, namely the Exterior Penalty Function (EPF), is used to solve the optimization problem [16], [17]. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:…”
Section: B Contributionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, a voltage regulator has been considered in this system as another option to control voltage deviation. A derivative-based optimization method, namely the Exterior Penalty Function (EPF), is used to solve the optimization problem [16], [17]. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:…”
Section: B Contributionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Meanwhile, Wang et al [20] analyzed government incentives and effort levels under conditions of information symmetry and asymmetry based on principal-agent theory; ultimately, they concluded that given information symmetry, the central government can help local governments reach the Pareto optimal effort level through the design of incentive contracts. In addition, experts have presented solutions to the optimal incentive strategy with consideration of the incentive compatibility constraint problem [21][22][23][24]. At present, principal-agent theory has been widely studied and applied, and the literature provides solid theoretical and operational support for our study of the principal-agent relationship between NPOs and enterprises, including our construction of an incentive model for reserve emergency medical supply production capacity.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%