A Political Economy of International Migration, 1815‐1914*

Foreman‐Peck, James

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9957.1992.tb00469.x

Cited by 43 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In practice, countries may choose to restrict immigration because existing distortions, such as the existence of social-insurance programs financed by non-lumpsum taxes, make a departure from free immigration the constrained optimum (Scholten and Thum, 1996;Wellisch and Walz, 1998;Razin and Sadka, 1999). 59 Or, governments may choose to restrict immigration because they weight the welfare of different individuals unequally, for whatever reason favoring those opposed to immigration (Foreman-Peck, 1992). For instance, if the median voter is a worker whose wages would be reduced by immigration, politicians may choose to restrict immigration in order to enhance their future electoral prospects (Benhabib, 1996).…”

Section: The Determination Of Us Enforcement Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States

Hanson

2006

115

155

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. In this paper, I selectively review recent literature on illegal migration from Mexico to the United States. I begin by discussing methods for estimating stocks and flows of illegal migrants. While there is uncertainty about the size of the unauthorized population, new data sources make it possible to examine the composition of legal and illegal populations and the time-series covariates of illegal labor flows. I then consider the supply of and demand for illegal migrants. Wage differentials between the United States and Mexico are hardly a new phenomenon, yet illegal migration from Mexico did not reach high levels until recently. An increase in the relative size of Mexico's workingage population, greater volatility in U.S.-Mexico relative wages, and changes in U.S. immigration policies are all candidate explanations for increasing labor flows from Mexico. Finally, I consider policies that regulate the cross-border flow of illegal migrants. While U.S. laws mandate that authorities prevent illegal entry and punish firms that hire unauthorized immigrants, these laws are imperfectly enforced. Lax enforcement may reflect political pressure by employers and other interests that favor open borders. _____________________ I thank Roger Gordon and seminar participants at the 2006 AEA meetings, Boston University, MIT, Syracuse University, and Tufts University for helpful comments and Jeff Lin and Maribel Pichardo for excellent research assistance.2

show abstract

Section: The Determination Of Us Enforcement Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States

Hanson

2006

115

155

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Capital and labor's ability to influence the political process in turn affects states' openness to these interests. Few would argue that states exist solely to do the bidding of the economically powerful, 1 but the modal experience since the advent of the modern state has been one of alliance with elites that own the bulk of land and capital (Foreman‐Peck 1992). From this standpoint, state capacity is a function of its alignment with wealthy and powerful agents, and legitimacy is imputed to state actions rather than explained.…”

Section: Explanations Of Legitimate State Capacitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Rules, Red Tape, and Paperwork: The Archeology of State Control over Migrants

Martin¹

2008

J Historical Sociology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Conventional accounts of a drastic shift to migration restriction after World War I following a golden era of free movement obscure crucial processes of state formation around matters of administering migration. How and with what consequences did state control over migration become acceptable and possible after the Great War? Existing studies have centered on core countries of immigration and thus underestimate the degree to which legitimate state capacities have developed in a political field spanning sending and receiving countries with similar designs on the same international migrants. Relying on archival research, and an examination of the migratory field constituted by two quintessential emigration countries (Italy and Spain), and a traditional immigration country (Argentina) since the mid-nineteenth century, this article argues that widespread acceptance of migration control as an administrative domain rightfully under states' purview, and the development of attendant capacities have derived from legal, organizational, and administrative mechanisms crafted by state actors in response to the challenges posed by mass migration. Concretely, these countries codified migration and nationality laws, built, took over, and revamped migration-related organizations, and administratively encaged mobile people through official paperwork. The nature of efforts to evade official checks on mobility implicitly signaled the acceptance of migration control as a bona fide administrative domain. In more routine migration management, states legitimate capacity has had unforeseen intermediate-and long-term consequences such as the subjection of migrants (and, because of ius sanguinis nationality laws, sometimes their descendants) to other states' administrative influence and the generation of conditions for dual citizenship. Study findings challenge scholarship that implicitly views states as constant factors conditioning migration flows, rather than as developing institutions with historically variable regulatory abilities and legitimacy. It extends current work by specifying mechanism used by state actors to establish migration as an accepted administrative domain.

show abstract

“…Moreover, the 1915 Iowa State Census sample is large and derived from a true population census 12 . According to Goldin Table 1).…”

Section: Education In the United States 1870-1930mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The new legislation aimed at increasing the numpopulation. 12 For an extensive review of the data sources over the nineteenth century, please refer to the Historical Statistics of the United States and Goldin (1999). 13 With the exception of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act which imposed restrictions on immigration from Asia.…”

Section: Immigration Laws Education and The Americanization Process mentioning

confidence: 99%

American education in the age of mass migrations 1870–1930

Murtin

Viarengo

2009

Cliometrica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in American Education in the Age of Mass Migrations 1870-1930Fabrice Murtin Martina Viarengo The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. , which take into account the impact of mass migrations on the US educational level. We reconstruct the foreign-born US population by age and by country of origin, while combining data on the flow of migrants by country and the age pyramids of migrants by country. Then we use original data on educational attainment in the nineteenth century presented in Morrisson and Murtin (2008) in order to estimate the educational level of US immigrants by age and by country. As a result, our series are consistent with the first national estimates of average schooling in 1940. We show that mass migrations have had a significant but modest impact on the US average educational attainment. However, the educational gap between US natives and immigrants was large and increased with the second immigration wave, a phenomenon that most likely fostered the implementation of restrictive immigration rules in the 1920s.JEL Classification: I2, J24, N70, O1

show abstract

A Political Economy of International Migration, 1815‐1914*

Cited by 43 publications

References 13 publications

Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States

Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States

Rules, Red Tape, and Paperwork: The Archeology of State Control over Migrants

American education in the age of mass migrations 1870–1930

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About